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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 2776 
ZAYDE B. RENNOLDS, ET AL., Appellants, 
versus 
ELSIE L. BRANCH, ET AL., Appellees. 
PETITION FOR APPEAL AND SUPERSEDEAS. 
To the Honorable, the Chief Justice and .Justices of the 811-
preme Court of Appeals of Vfr,ginia: 
The petition of Zayde Branch Rennolds and Louise Branch 
respectfully shows that they are aggrieved by a final decree 
made by the Chancery Court of the City of Richmond on 
May 22, 1943, in a chancery cause in which the complainants 
were :Melville C. Branch and Robert G. Cabell, III, trustees 
under the will of John P. Branch, deceased, and the respond-
ents were Elsie L. Branch, Melville C. Branch and ::Milton J. 
Beirne, executors of the will of John .. A.kin Br.anch, deceased, 
Elsie L. Branch, Zayde Branch Rennolds, Louise Branch,, and 
Margaret Branch Glasgow. 
Your petitioners pray that an appeal may be allowed them 
from said decree and that a s1tpetsedeas may be awarded sus-
pending the operation of said decree pending such ap-
2* peal except as to ihe part of said decree *in favor of Mar-
garet Branch Glasgow, there being no controversy be-
hveen her' and any other party to this cause. 
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A transcript of the record of the Chancery Court of the 
City of Richmond in said cause is fi1led herewith. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
The trustees under the will of John P. Brancl1 brought 
tlJis suit to obtain.a construction o~ his will. They were hold-
ing property worth about $250,000 in trust for Blythe W. 
Branch for his life. The said Blythe died in 1942 and the 
trustees sought the guidance of the Chancellor in the dis-
tribution of the corpus of the fund. All the parties agreed 
that Margaret Bra:p.ch Glasgow wa~ entitled to one-half the 
corpus. With respect to the other half, the appellants claimed 
all of it and Elsie L. Branch, the widow and sole legatee of 
John Akin Branch, claimed one-third of it. The tmstees are 
of course neutral in this controversy, especially in view of the 
fact that one of them, Melville C. Branch, is also one of the 
executors of John Akin Branch. The decree of the Chancerv 
Court awarded one-third of said one-half to the executors ~f 
J obn Akin Branch and one-third to each of the two appel-
lants. The amount in controversy is therefore about $42,000. 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. 
The court below erred in decreeing that the *executors 
3~ of John Akin Branch were entitlel to one-sixth of the 
trust fund held by trustees for the life of Blythe W. 
Branch under the 5th Article of the will of .John P. Branch. 
It should have decreed that Zayde Branch Rennolds and 
Louise Branch were each entitled to one-fourth of said trust 
fund and that the executors of John Akin Branch were en-
titled to none of it. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
'.r11e facts are not in dispute, and are as follows: 
John P. Branch died in February, 1915, leaving surviving· 
hi~ four children, namely, ,John Kerr Branch, Blythe 
"\V. Branch, Effie Branch and l\fargaret Branch G-lasgow, and 
without other issue. His will was duly probated in the Chan-
cery Court of tbe City of Richmond on March 4, 1915. 
John Kerr Branch, his executor and son. died testate in 
the year 1930, survived by his son, John Akin Branch, and 
his daughters, Zayde Branch Rennolds.and Louise Branch. 
Effie Branch died in 1934, testate, but without issue. 
,Tohn Akin Branch died testate and without issue in the 
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year 1935, leaving his entire estate, after a few personal be-
quests, which have long since been paid and satisfied,, to 
his wife, Elsie L. Branch, absolutely and *in fee simple. 
4 * She is also one of his executors. 
Blythe W. Branch, the other son of the testator, John 
P. Branch, died testate, but without issue, on May 22, 1942. 
Margaret Branch Glasgow, the remaining child of the tes-
tator, is still alive. · 
In the contingency that happened, namely, the death of 
Blythe W. Branch without issue living at his death, the fol-
lowing language of the last clause of Article 5 of the will of 
John P. Branch came into operation: 
"but should he [Blythe ,v. Branch] leave no child, nor the 
issne of any child, him surviving, then said principal sum 
shall pass and descend to my own child or children then liv-
ing, and_ the issue of such as may have died leaving issue, 
such issue to take per stir1ws. '' · 
It is the foregoing language that has given rise to this 
controversy, and, in order that it may be seen in its context, 
we give the whole of the 5th Article, which reads as follows 
(Tr. R., pp. 16 and 17): · 
'' 5th One other of the said four equal parts or portions 
in the foregoing clause of this, my will, ref erred to and pro-
vided for, I give to my said son, John Kerr Branch and 
A.rthur G. Glasgow IN TRUST, nevertheless., to hold the 
~mme for the support and maintenance of my said son, Blythe 
W. Branch for and during the term of his natural life, and 
the income and profits thence arising they shall pay over to 
my said son quarterly, the first payment to be made at the 
expiration of six months from the date of my ·death. 
"I authorize and empower my son, the said Blythe W. 
Branch if he shall lmve any child or children, grandchild 
5* or grandchildren, ""great grandchild or great grandchil-
dren living at his death, by his last will and teRtament, to 
dispose of th~ principal sum herein and hereby given in trust 
for bim during· his natural life as he may in that event de-
ter.mine, desire and direct. 
'' Should he not, in such case, by his last will and testa-
ment, appoint and provide for the disposition of the same, 
tben I will and direct that at the death of my said son., the· 
principal of the said sum so held in trust for him shall pass 
and descend to such child or children as he may leave, him 
surviving, and the issue of such as may have died leaving · 
issue, such issue .to take per stirpes; but should he leave no 
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child, nor the issue of any child, him surviving, then said 
principal sum shall pass and descend to. my own child or chil-
dren then living, and the issue of such as may have died leav-
ing issue, such issue to take per stirpes." 
The present controversy grows out of the circumstance 
that one of the testator's grandchildren (John Akin) outlived 
his father (John Kerr) but died before his uncle (Blythe W.), 
the life tenant. 
T]ie. testator died in 1915 lea,Ting four children, of whom 
.John Kerr died in 1930, Effie died in 1934 without issue, 
Blythe vV. died in 1942 without issue, and l\farg·aret (Mrs. 
Glasgow) is still living . 
.T ohn Kerr left three children, ~T olm Akin, who died in 1935 
without issue., and the appellants. 
The Branch family tree, so far as material to an under-
standing of the fae:ts involved in tl1is case is as follows: 
6 
JOHN P. BRANCH 
(d. 1915) 
*-Blythe W. 
(d. 1942, without ~ue) 
-John Akin 







(d. 1934, without issue) 
-Margaret 
.A.R.G UMENT. 
The legal mind frequently but unnecessarily feels so great 
a need for the support of precedents that it fixes its eye first, 
and often too exclusively, on the multitudinous and comfort-
in~dv well-settled canons of construction. Such a course in-
. e;iti1bly tends to lead the expositor to pick out a favorite 
etm0n or two and force the will to fit the selected canons. 
The vice of this procrustean method is that it usually dis-
torts the true meaning of the testator and does violence to 
the most important canon of them all, namely, that if the 
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meaning and intent of the testator are fairly and reason-
ably clear from a consideration of his will as a whole, ex-
trinsic aids are not to be invoked for the purpose of 
7* *thwarting them. 
We therefore take as our text the words of Mr. ,Justice 
Holt in Rady v. Staia.rs, 160 Va. 373 at page 378: ''no will has 
a brother," and invite the court to inspect John P. Branch's 
will, which, we submit, is not ambiguous. 
Point I . 
. The will is not arn,bigitoiis. It clearly and de finitely ,qives 
the corpy,s of the t-rust f1ind in disp11te to the testator's de-
scendants in being at t]ie death of the Zif e tenant, Blythe W. 
Branch. 
The will provides that, on the death of Blythe W. Branch, 
the life tenant, without issue: 
'' ~ * * then said principal sum sha.ll pass and descend to 
my own child or children then living, and the issue of such 
as may have died leaving issue, such issue to take per 
.stirpe,c;. '' (Italics added.) 
The testator left four children, two of whom (John Kerr 
and Effie) died before the life tenant (Blythe wr.). Effie 
never married. ,John Kerr left three children. Hence there 
were two stocks to divide the corpus. One stock is represented 
by tl1e testator's daughter, Margaret B. Glasgow, and there 
is no doubt that she takes half the corpus. The other half 
goes to· the stock of J obn Kerr. Two of his children ( the 
appe11ants) are still living·, and one of llis children (John 
Akin) died before the life tenant. 
The question before the court is whether, on the death of 
Blythe Vl. Branch, the life tenant, without issue, *the 
8'i!< testator intended a dead grandson to share with bis liv-
ing granddaughters. 
If the whole will is read simply as it is written there can 
be no doubt as to its meaning. 
The surest and safest guide in the construction of wills is 
that the testator's intention, expressed in his will, is to be 
ascertained, if possible, from the will itself before any subor-
dinate rule of construction is applied. As said in James v. 
Peoples National Bank, 178 Ya. 398,404: 
"While rules of construction are well established, the -
dominating rule is the intention of the testator. This inten-
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tion, gathered from the whole' wil11 must predominate· over 
all technical words and expressions .. ' ., 
When, from the testator's Ianguage1 as used by him, his 
purpose and intent are clear it is not necessary to consider 
what presumptions would apply to his language if it were 
not elear .. 
In Trice v. Pawell, 168 Va. 397 at 401, tbe court said: 
"The general rules of construction will assist us as a 
guide; but, after all, each case must be governed by its own 
facts and circumstances .. 
"Once we are able to ascertain the intention of the testa-
tor, we will adopt that as the polar star to guide and direct 
us, and in ascertaining th8.t intention, we will look upon the 
instrument as a whole, and give effect, if possible1 to every 
part thereof. If from reading the will as a whole, the testa-
tor's intention is clear, it will stand as written; • • • ." 
In Whitehurst v. White, 160 Va. 859 at 866: 
"• • • we must, wl1en possible, sustain a ~testator's in-
9* tention. 
" 'This rule is familiar and elementary and to it all 
others are subordinate ancl subservient.''' .. 
.And at page 867 : 
''In the lig·ht of these general rules and bearing constantly 
in mind the· fact that all rules are subservient to the testa.:. 
tor 1s intention, let us look at the will itself." 
In .Tiffany v. Thomas, 168 Va. 31 at page 36 the court 
snid: 
'' 'And in order the better to comprehend the scheme which 
the testator had in his mind for the disposition of bis estate, 
the judicial expositor is permitted to place himself, figura-
tively speaking, in the very sl1oes of the person whm,e will he 
is called on to construe • «< *. ' ' ' · 
In Farrar v. Pemberton, 154 Ya. 61, the Court adopted as 
part of its opinion ( p. 65) the opinion of Judge Sutton in the 
lower court, in the course of which he said (p. 70): 
'' 'The court should not depart from the plain meaning of 
words to create an ambiguity that it may later construe those 
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words by certain recognized rules of construction. These 
rules are to be invoked only when the words of the testator., 
standing alone, create an ambiguity.' " 
In Hill v. Hill, 127 Va~ 341 at 347, the court said: 
'' * * * it will uot do * * * to isolate the words of a single 
clause from the circumstances under which they were used, 
the relationship of the testator to the beneficiaries, and the 
general testamentary scheme as disclosed by a view of the 
whole instrument. * ,,.. 1.~ Nor must we forget that 'uni-
10·ll< form justice is better than strict *consistency,' * * *. '' 
In this will, John ·P. Branch sets up a separate trust fund 
for the support and maintenance of each of his four children 
for life. The provisions relating to each of the four funds 
are the same, and, if the children die without issue, there are 
cross remainders in favor of the other stocks. We are con-
cerned here only with the devolution of the fund created for 
the support of Blythe V{. Branch for his life. 
'rhe testator provided that, at the death of Blythe W. 
Branch, the corpus of the fund should go to Blythe's issue 
if he had any living· at bis death and if he did not choose to 
disinherit them. Next, the testator had to and did consider 
what would become of the property in the contingency that 
Blythe might not have any children, or that any he had might 
die before he did. 
Certainly it cannot be disputed that the testator, when he 
reached that point, had his attention· focused on the date of 
Blythe's death. With his attentionuecessarily directed to the 
date of Blythe's death and the contingency that Blythe mig·ht 
leave no issue, the testator wrote : 
'' * * * thw;1, said principal sum shall pass and descend to 
my o:wn child or children then living·, and the issue of such 
. as may have died leaving issue * •)!: *." (Italics added.) 
The first "then" refers both to the rfate and *the 
11 * contingency. It embodies in itself the idea of ''then' 
and in that contingency'' and the idea of "at that time.'' 
It obviously cannot and does not refer to any other time. 
What is to happen at that time¥ The corpus then, and in 
that contingency only, "shall pass and descend." There is, 
we submit, no room for the argument based on the notion 
that the corpus had already passed and descended and that 
merely the payment over of the legacy is postponed to that 
date. The testator fixes that time expressly as the. date on 
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which "said principal sum shall pass and descend." If the 
corpus had already vested in the ultimate takers before that 
date~ it could not possibl)r pass and descend to them on that 
date. · 
The words "pass and descend'' ·are appropriate to de-
scribe a cbang·e of title following death, but are not at all 
appropriate to describe wlmt happens when somebody who 
already has a vested title to property gets possession of it. 
Thev are the same words that are used in the statute of 
descents (Code, Section 5264): If a person who owns land 
dies intestate, ''it shall descend and pass". 
Furthermore, the words of the will : '' said principal sum'' 
obviously refer to the whole principal sum and not merely 
to some part of it. The testator had in mind and has un-
equivocally expressed his intent that the whole principal sum 
shall pass from the life tenant at one time. He had four 
12$ children, he left each of them *a trust fund for life., and 
he described in the same language bow each trust fund 
was to pass on the death of the life tenant. It would neces-
sarily happen that when the first life tenant died, three of the 
remaindermen would be children of the testator, and when 
the second life tenant died two of the remaindermen would 
be children of the testator, and when the third life tenant 
died, one of the remaindermen would be a child of the testa-
tor. So the testator said: 
"then said principal sum shall pass and descend to my own 
C'hild or children then living * * *.'' 
It is clear beyond any possibility of argument that the 
child or children of the testator had t6 be living then in order 
to take. At least three, two, or one of the takers has to he 
living when the first, second or third life tenant dies. The 
will says, in each case, that the '' said principal sum'' shall 
pass then. It is not to pas~ piecemeal: it i~ all to pass at the 
s~me time. If some of the takers have to be then livin~ iu 
0rcler to take it logically and naturally follows that all must 
he then living in order to take. 
Tl1e Chancellor plac.ed his decision on the g:round that the 
fo8tator did not repeat the words "then livinµ;" in the phrase 
relating· to the issue of his deceased children. "\Ve sub-
13* mit that if the testator had *repeated the words '' then 
living" it would not have made his meaning an~· more 
obvious than it is. It is clear that none of the ultimate re-
mainclermen is given anything until the life tenant dies. The 
persons to talm cannot be ascertained until the life tenant 
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dies, because, until then, it cannot be lmown whether or not 
the life tenant will be survived by a child. The will desig-
nates the takers (if the life tenant dies without issue) as his 
own "children then living, and the issue of such as may have 
<lied * * *." The gift is to a class all of whom take cotem-
'pora neously. 
In other parts of his will the testator describes the class 
of takers in language similar to this, namely: "my own child 
-0r children then living·, and the issue. of such as may have 
died leaving issue.'' In those other parts of the will it is 
-equally clear that the testator, in using that phraseology, in-
tends to designate a class of takers, all of whom must be 
.alive at the time of the simultaneous taking1 notwithstand-ing that he does not repeat the words "then living·." 
'rhus, in the second article of his will, the testator directs 
ihat the proceeds of the sale of the residue of his real estate 
:shall: 
"be equally divided between my children living at my death, 
and the issue of such as may have previously died leaving 
issue ~ * •." 
14* •There he does not repeat the word "living'' but it 
is clear beyond cavil that he means that the issue as 
well as the children must be then living. ,;\Te point"to the lan-
guage in question because it demonstrates that whenever the 
testator in his will uses the word ''living'' as applied to chil-
dren be equally understands and intends it as applying also 
to the issue of deceased children. He thinks of them as an 
entire class: his living ,children and the issue of his deceased 
~hildren, whoever they may be, who are to take per stirpes. 
In the third Article of his will, the testator directs that half 
ihe residue of his personal estate '' shall be equally divided 
l)etween my children living at my death., and tl1e issue of sucl1 
a~: may have died leaving· issue * * *." There again the word 
''living" is used only once but it is again certain that all 
takers must be simultaneously living·. 
The remaining half of his personal estate the testator then 
splits up into the four trust funds, one for each of l1is chil-
drcm, for life. 
Turning again to the 5th Article, which deals with the trust 
fund for his son Blythe, we find that if Blythe has children, 
grandchildren or great gTandchildren ''living at his death" 
th~n he is given a general power of appointment. If, how-
ever, he should have that power of appointment and fail to 
exercise it, the will goes on! 
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15• •" • • • at the death of my said son, the principal of 
the said sum so held in trust for him shall pass. and de-
scend to such child or children as he may leave, him surviv-
ing, and the issue of such as may have died leaving issue-
* •• ,, 
'l'here again, it is., we submit, a:lm:ndantly clear that the 
testator refers only to persons living at the death of Blythe,. 
notwithstandtng the words "him surviving'' ave used only 
onc.e. The ''·children * • * bim surviving1 and the issue of' 
such as may have died 1 ' constitute the class of takers. If the-
testator bad stopped with the words "l1im surviving,'' the is-
sue of deceased children would I1ave been excluded altog·ether. 
The testator intended such issue to take if they were then 
alive, but not if they were then dead. ...l\nd this intent is made 
unequivocally clear and positive by the express declaration 
that if no such issue be then living, the principal of the fund 
should go to. the ultimate remaindermen ~ 
'' e. • • but should he leave no child, nor t11e issue of any 
child, him surviving, then said principal sum shall pass 
* Ii * ,., 
Throughout his will, the testator emphasizes his intention 
to benefit the living and not the dead, to provide for his chil-
dren, grandchildren, great grandchildren~ his descendants,. 
his issue ver stirpes. His will discloses no wish to benefit 
collateral relatives or the spouses of the testator "s de-
scendants. A gift to a descendant who had died l)ef ore he 
could receive and enjoy it was not contemplated by the 
16.. testator. He refers ~1'to his deceased children onlv for 
the purpose of providing· that their is.c;ue ( not just 'their 
children) should receive their shares, per sf.irpes. In no 
other way could he conveniently and clearly designate a class 
consisting of his living children and the issue of llis deceased 
children except by referring to those of bis children who 
we1·e living and those who were d~acl. 
Ten times in his will, the testator uses the expression: 
'' the issue of such as may lmve died leaving issue.'" 
(The only variation appears in the second clause, where 
the word "previously'' is inserted before the word "died".) 
One of the most elementary and obvious of all rules or 
corn~tructio11 is that when the same expression nppears more 
than once in a will, it probably has the same meaning each 
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time it appears; and we point out thnt the testator's intent, 
when he uses this identical language in other parts of his 
will, is so unmistakably clear that its meaning is not debat-
able. 
In the leading case of Re Jodrell, L. R. · 44 Ch. D. 590, the 
testator left a number of legacies to various people and the 
residue of his large estate '' to be equally divided among such 
of mv relatives hereinbef ore uamed * • •.'' 
· Among the persons thereinbefore named were *sev-
17* eral persons who were not relatives of the testator, 
solely because his grnndmother had not married his 
grandfather. Nevertheless the testator had referred to each 
of them in his will as my ''cousin'' so and so. The Chancery 
Division held that "The strict and accurate meaning of the 
word 'relatives' is 'legitimate relatives,'" and denied the il-
legitimate cousins of the testator a share in the residue; but 
the Court of Appeal reversed. , · 
Lord Halsbury said: 
"* * e I mvself am whollv unable to understand in what 
way a court of construction "is called upon to put particular 
interpretations upon particuiin· words with reference to any 
~upposed presumption that the law makes either way. For 
:myself, I am prepared to look at the instrument such as it is; 
to see the languag·e that is used in it; to look at the whole 
of the document., and not to part of it; and, having looked 
at the whole of the document, to see (if I can) through the 
instrument what was the mind of the testator. Those are 
general principles for the construction of all instruments-
and to that extent it may be said that they are canons of con-
struction.'' 
* 
"Now, with reference to Major King-, Georgiana Ford and 
to Emily MacDonnell * • *. They are persons, all three of 
them, with respect to· whom the bar sinister would prevent 
the actual application in strictness of that language * * *. 
Did he mean those persons when he spoke of his 'relatives'? 
I confess for myself I cannot entertain the smallest doubt 
that they were in his mind as relatives "" • *. He has there-
f0re * • * given me a dictionary w11creby I find that his wife's 
relatives, the nieces, and his illegitimate cousins are his rela-
tives * * *." · 
69 Corpus· Juris, 84 says: 
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18* *"Where the same words are used in different parts 
of a will relating to the same subject matter, they are 
presumed to be used in the same sense if the context of the 
will does not show a contrary intention, und so a doubtful 
phrase may be construed by comparing it with similar 
phrases in other parts of the will in which the intention of 
the testator is clear * * •." 
In Guthrie v. Gitthrie, 1 Call 7 (1797), the question was 
whether a testator, described by the court as ''wholly illit-
~rate and incapable of expressing himself properly,'' meant 
to devise his land in fee simple although he failed to use 
words of inheritance. 
Judge Roane said ( p. 13) : 
'' The word 'have' in the devise to tT ames is the same as 
that used in the clause which disposed of the cattle. In the 
latter it not only passed the absolute interest according to 
the principles of law., but the testator certainly intended that 
it should have this operation, when applied to personal prop-
erty • * *. It is fair then to give to the same expression in 
the devise of the land the same meaning.'' 
J udg·e Lyons said ( p. 15) : 
"When therefore he says that .James shall 'have' his land, 
his meaning was that ,Tames should have the whole interest. 
'' Having fixed an appropriate meaning therefore to the 
w01·d 'have,' it is fair to give it the same interpretation in the 
limitation over to Richard.'' 
In Gray v. Fra1icis, 139 Va. 350, the court held that the 
,vord "or" must be construed to mean "or." The court said 
(p. 361): 
'' And if a given word is used in one part of tbe will with 
a certain meaning, it will be presumed to be used in 
19* another part of •the will with the same meaning." 
The court pointed out (p. 362): 
''The word 'or' is not anvwhere used in the will with a 
menuing different from its ordinary sense.'' 
But, counsel objected, in Goldsborou_qh v. W ashh,gton, 112 
Va. 104, the court held that the word "or'' meant "and." 
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The opinion in Gray v. Francis points out that the applica-
tion of the same principle produced the opposite result, say-
ing (p. 363): 
~' * • • the decision rests upon 9 * * the application of the 
well settled rule, above referred to, that where a given word 
is used in one part of the will with a certain meaning, it will 
be presumed to be used in another part of the will with the 
:same meaning; * • *. '' 
And at pag·e 364: 
'' As said in the opinion in Goldsboroitgh v. liVa.r;hington 
(112 Va.,, at p. 115, 70 S. E. 528). 'In other provisions of the 
will the testator uses the word ''or'' manif estlv in the sense 
·of ''and,'' or conjunctively.' The opinion thereupon refers 
to and quotes 'from three such instances in the will.'' 
We submit that the will of John P. Branch is entirely free 
-from ambiguity and that artificial rules of construction need 
not and should not be resorted to for the purpose of constru-
ing it. The application of such rules in a case where they 
-are not needed can serve only to confuse the issue and mis-
·con strue the will. · 
*Point II. 
The fundamental principle and 1nethod proverly a,JJvlicable 
.tn the consfriwtion of all wills. 
In McCaniant v. Nu,ckolls, 85 Va. 831, the court, citing many 
•earlier cases, laid down the fundamental principle which has 
-always been followed in the construction of wills, saying at 
])age 337: 
"The cardinal rule for the interpretation of wills is, to 
-collect the intention of the testator from the whole will, taken 
tog·ether as a consistent whole formed of all its parts; and, 
if such intention be lawful, full effect must be given to it. 
Intention is the life and soul of a will, and the great point 
to he ascertained; when it is clear, and violates no rule of 
law. it must govern with absolute sway.'' 
More recently, Mr. Justice Browning·., in Hickman v. Hick-
man, 156 Va. 659 at 663 has said.: 
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'' In the construction of wills the primary thing to do, as 
has been held by the cases from this and all other jurisdic-
tion, as far as we know, which is accentuated by the text-
writers, is to find what the intention was of the person mak-
ing the will, and that is to be arrived at by giving effect to 
the will in its entirety, reading it as a whole and reconciling 
all of its clauses, if faidy possible to do so, in the light of 
the language used and to give effect to every part of tbe-
instrument, provided sensible effect can be given not incon-
sistent ·with the g·enei·al intent.' 1 
Bearing constantly in mind that the object of all inter-
pretation and construction is to ascertain the testator's: 
meaning and intention, and that the stuest method of so do-
ing is to consider the will as a *whole and in all its 
21 • parts, it is respectfully insisted that even if rules of 
construction be resorted to in the insfant case, they 
will but confirm and fortify the conclusions thus reached. 
· It is further respectfully submitted that the decisions of 
the Supreme Court of Appeals., in construing the countless 
wills that have come before it, are not in any real conflict. 
Though different results have been reaehed in the interpre-
tation of somewhat similar wills, these differing results, it 
will be found, arise, not from inconsistency in the well-recog-
nized canons of construction that have been adopted by the 
court, but rather from the sound application of the appro-
priate canon to the case in band under the guidance of the 
above-stated principle and method of approach. Different 
canons apply to different wills, but the fundamental prin-
ciple applies to all wills. 
The errors into which lower courts have occasionally been 
led, most frequently arise, we suggest, from their failure to 
give due consideration to and to make sound application .of 
the primary principle and universally recognized method of 
approacl1, and from their giving too much consideration to 
some general, but secondary., and unfortunately inapplicable 
rule of construction. 
·we do not question the general rule that "where there is 
nothing in the will to sho·w that the tesfa.to-r ha(l a contrarJJ 
intent, the law favors the early vesting *of estates.'' 
22~ ·what we most earnestly insist upon, however, is that, 
where such contrary intent is apparent and manifest 
from the clear language of the will before the court for con-
strnction, the testator's manifested intention g·overus and 
cannot properly be sacrificed to the purt of the rule declar-
ing that the law favors the early vesting of estates. The 
whole rule must be applied to the who]e will, and the words, 
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"where there is nothing in the will to show that the testator 
had a contrary intent,'' are not only part of the rule itself, 
but the most important part. 
Vashon v. Vashon, 98 Va. 170, is directly in point. No 
judg·e has adhered more firmly to the opinion that the law 
favors and should favor the earliest possible vesting of es-
tates than Judge Keith. .A.nd yet, in the case cited, deliver-
ing the opinion of the court., he said (p. 175): 
'' It is true that courts lean to the vesting· of estates, but 
this rule of interpretation means no more than that courts 
will hold that the estate vests where the language of the in-
strument to be construed is such as to leave it doubtful 
whether the purpose was to create a vested or a conting·ent 
interest. We do not understand that language will be 
strained in order to accomplish that result.'' 
The same principle was applied by the court in Howbert 
v. Oauthorn, 100 Va. 649, in which the court said (p. 651): 
'' It is true that the lnw prefers vested to contingent 
23* remainders, and this *preference may lawfully and 
properly influence the mind in cases of doubtful con-
stmction; but it can never justify the courts in making a deed 
or will, or in straining the language used in order to make 
the estate created a vested rather than a contingent remain-
der. Olney v. Hull, 21 Pick. (Mass.) 311; Vashon v. Vashon, 
98 Va. 170." 
~rhe Massachusetts case relied on by the court in support 
of its ruling is abstracted on page 656 as follows: 
''In Olney v. H1.1,ll, 21 Pick. 311, a testator, after devising 
to bis wife the use of his real estate, while she remained his 
widow, proceeded as follows: .' Should my wife marry or die, 
the land then shall be equally divided among my surviving 
sons, with each son paying sixty dollars to my daughters., to 
he equally divided among· them, as soon as each son may 
come into possession of said land.' It was held that the re-
mainder g·iven to the sons was contingent until the marriage 
or death of the widow of the testator; and that upon her 
death, the estate vested in a son who was then living·, to the 
exclusion of the heirs of anoth01· son who died before the 
widow, but after tho death of the testator.'' 
If the cardinal principle of g·iving effect to the intention 
of the testator manifested in his will is kept constantly in 
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mind it will resolve all the apparent conflicts in the Virginia 
decisions, and it will appear that Vashon v. Vashon, 98 Ya. 
170, made no change in the well-settled law; that Cheatham 
v. Gower, 94 Va. 383, did not, as claimed by the ·west Vir-
ginia court in Dent v. Pickens, 61 "'V. Va. 4R8, 58 S. E. 1029, 
make any cl1ange in the law of Virg-inia; that All-i.c:on v. Alli-
son, 101 Va. 537, did not change the law of Virginia; 
24,.. that "'Driskill v. Canl'ile, 145 Va. 116, did not dmnge 
the law of Virginia nor depart from well-established 
J,rinciples; that Callis v. Ripl<3y, 161 Va. 472, did not change 
the law of Virginia; that ,Janrns v. Peovles Nation.al Bank, 
178 Va. 398, did not change the law of Vfrginia; that Ameri-
nan National Bank v. Herndon, 181 Va. 17, did not chang·e 
the law of. Virginia. . 
Although there has been much debate a.mong· lawyers and 
judges as to whether the court, in this long line of eases, 
which includes many in addition to those we have cited, has 
always adhered strictly to the same rules of com;truction, 
and although the rules of construction have been stated some-
what differentlv in the different cases, two striking· facts 
are not debatable: first, the unanimous court. or, in cases 
where the court was divided, the. majority of the court, has 
never professed to change, modify or overrule any of the 
Ntrlier decisions; and, second, each and all of the cases recog-
nized and soundly applied to the will before the court the 
nniversal, uncontradicted and primary rule .of construction 
that the intention of the testator as made manifest bv his 
will is the polar star for the guidance of tl1e court. · 
In Jam,es v. PPOple.c: Nation.al Bank, 178 Va. 398, at 405, 
tho court refers to Call-is v. Riplev, 161 Va. 472, saying·: 
"Appellants, in effect, contend that . *the case of 
25* Calli.c; v. RivleJJ, 161 Va. 472, 171 S. E. 497. modified 
the rule in Virginia, as stated in the case~ heretofore 
eited." 
The court disposes of that contention by pointing out that 
,Tudge Chinn said: "In dealing with wills general rules of 
rom;truction are to be applied with reservations • * *." Mr. 
,T ustice Hudgins then points out that in the case before the 
eourt the testator's meaning is ascertainable from an inspec-
Hnn of his will without the help of artificial presumptions. 
He ('Onstrues the will by applying··the natural inference that 
if two clauses of the will deal with similar subjects and one 
of the.clauses is perfectly clear, the other clause, if doubtful, 
will be construed to have the same meaning as the clear 
clause. 
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Keeping always in mind, then, the only universal rule of 
{!Onstruction applicable alike to all wills: that the testator's 
intention, as disclosed by the lang'Uage of his will, governs 
the devolution of his property, we invite the court to com-
pare the lang·uage of the will in the Callis Case with the lan-
guage of the will in the case at bar. It will be apparent that 
the two wills are so similar that the reasoning of the court, 
with respect to the words there used, is applicable to the 
words in John P. Branch's will. 
In the case at bar, the will says: 
'' Should he leave no child, nor the issue of any child, him 
surviving, then said principal sum shall pass and 
26* *descend to my own child or children then living, and 
the issue of such as may have died leaving issue, such 
issue to take per stirpes. '' 
Tn the Callis Case the will said: 
"' and should he die leaving no lawful issue of his body, then 
the said land and improvements shall be equally divided with 
my next surviving· heirs." 
The significant similarities between the two wills ar&. 
l. In both cases the life tenant has to die without leaving 
surviving issue, before the clause in favor of the remainder-
men becomes operative. 
2. In both cases the testator uses the word ''then'' after 
the provision requiring the li.fe tenant to die without issue 
as a condition precedent to the gift over. 
With respect to those two points, which are matters of 
fad and not of law, the court in the Callis Case' said (p. 477): 
'' As previously noted, under the provisions of the will, 
the lawful issue of "'\V. 0. Ripley, if any, take a fee simple 
estate in the property at his death~ and the devise over can-
not take effect until the death of said "\V. O. Ripley, without 
issue. It, therefore, appears manifest that the language, 
'then said land and improvements shall be equally divided 
·with my next surviving· heirs,' read in connection with the 
preceding provisions of the will, not only clearly denotes the 
time the ultimate beneficiaries are to take and the property 
divided among them, but also designates the time the 
27* persons who answer the description of testator's *'n~xt 
surviving heirs' are to be ascertained. Considering the 
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context, the word 'next,' of itself, we think, shows that tile 
words 'surviving heirs' were intende·d to r·ef er· to the heirs,. 
or next of kin, of the testator Jiving at the death of his son,. 
William 0. Ripley,, without himself leaving issue .. If' the tes-
tator had intended the words of survivorship to apply to the 
sons living at the time of his death, the word 'next,' as it 
seems to us, would be entirely unnecessary and purpoS'e]ess. ',. 
No will has a brother-1 but that will is our will's first 
co1isin .. 
Point lll .. 
~I'he remainders a.re contin.rJ<mt. 
"\¥ e submit that it would be impossible to imagine a clearer 
case of contingent remainders. 
The definition of a vested remainder, quoted from 2 l\finor's 
Inst. 388, by the com·t in Callis v. Rivley, l 61 Va. 472 at 475 
is: 
"A vested remainder is a remainder limited to a certain 
· person on a certain event, so as to possess a present capacity 
to take effect in possession should the possession become 
vacant." 
In our case, as in the Callis Case, both the evell;t and the 
persons are uncertain by the express Iariguage of the will. 
The event is that Blythe should die witllout surviving is-
sue. When the will was written and whe~ it was pro-
28* bated it was not certain that Blvthe would die •without 
surviving issue. That event coulcl not be known until 
he died. None of the children of J olm Kerr could get any 
part of this trust fund unless as a contingent condition prece-
dent, Blythe should die without sm·vivi.ng issue. vVhen that 
event should take place, if ever, could not he known before 
the event. The remaindermen to take in that contingency 
could not be ascertained until the conting·ency occurred. Un-
til then it could not be known which of the testator's children 
would be still alive nor which would have died leaving issue, 
nor how manv nor how remote that issue would be. 
The u1timate remainders in the instant case are., we sub-
mit, expressly and incontrovertibly contingent remainders. 
The situation in our case is the same as that in the Call-i.c:: 
Case, in which the court said (p. 475) : 
''Both the event upon which the devise over is limited, and 
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tlu~ person or persons who would take upon the happening 
of the event, being· rendered uncertain by tbe terms of the 
will, neither E. T. Ripley, nor any of the smviving heirs of 
!,he testator, could by any possibility take a vested remainder 
m the estate." 
"\Ve fully recognize the rule and concur in the policy that 
remainders should be construed to he vested rather than 
contingent if it is possible· and reasonable to do so. But in 
the case at bar it is impossible in law or in reason to con-
strue these remainders as anything but contingent until t11e 
death of Blythe without issue. 
2H* '\Judge Lamb, in his opinion (R .. ~ p. 4'9) says: 
'' If called upon to do so the Court would specify the 
teclmieal estates which existed at and after the· death of John 
Kerr Branch as follows:. A remainder vested in right in 
tT ohn Akin Branch, subject to be divested upon the interven-
tion of a condition subsequent,-t.he birth of a child to tbe 
life tennnt, Blythe Vv. Branch.'' · 
But this i.s in the teeth of the expr'ess language of the will 
and of the opinion of the court rendered by Judg·e Keith in 
Vaslwn v. TT aslwn, 98 Va. 170. Here the will itself makes 
the death of Blythe without issue a condition precedent.. If 
Blythe dies without issue, the ultimate remaindermen will 
take, otherwise they will g;et nothing. 
The languag·e of the will is : 
''but should he leave no child nor the issue of any child, him 
survjving, then said principa,l sum shall pass and descend 
* * *.'' (Italics added.) 
If that is not a condition precedent, then it is impossible· 
to devise language that will create one. 
A similar effort to transmute a condition precedent into 
a condition subsequent was unsuccessful in Howbert v. Cau-
thorn, 100 Va. 649, in which the court said (p. 652) : 
"After carving out the life _estate in favor of Lucy Ann 
Thomas, tbe remainder is given to the children 'living at the 
death of the sa,id L1w·y Ann Thomas,' and if there be 110 such 
child or children. nor the descendants of any such 'livin-.rJ at 
the rleath of the said Ltt.ey Ann,' then over. This language 
is too plain for construction. In express terms the 
30.x. *period of survivorship is :fixed at the death of Lucy 
Ann Thomas, the life tenant. It is manifest that the 
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remaindermen, who are to take after the termination of the 
life estate, cannot be known or ascertained until the life 
tenant is dead, for it is not given to man to know who will 
survive a future event, itself, in point of time, the most un-
certain of all events. It is therefore clear that appellant has 
no interest under the deed in question during the lifetime of 
lier mother, Lucy Ann, but a continµ:ent remainder. Her in-
terest is dependent upon the condition precedent that she 
survive the life tenant. She may, therefore, never have an 
interest in the subject, for if the lifo tenant 8honlcl survive 
her, the estate would pass to others who~e identity cannot 
be now known or determined. 
'' The only way in which the remainder in favor of appel-
lant could be considered vested would be by construing the 
words of survivorship ('living at t11e death, etc.') as creating 
a condition subsequent., instead of precedent, this latter being 
plainly the nature of the condition in the case at bar, both on 
principle and authority." 
And at page 656: 
"It will be observed that tl1e learned author treats the 
1·emainder as conting;ent, without question, when the period 
of survivorship relates to the death of the life tenant. In 
such case he says: ''l.'he rnnwindP-r mu.,qt be contingent .. since 
110 one can tell who will be such 81.t.rvivors, until the dea.th 
of A,' the life tenant." 
rrhe learned Chancellor relies on .la·meson v. ,lmneson, 86 
Va. 51. The difference between that case and this is that in 
that case it was poss-ible for a gTanclcllild of the testator to 
1iave a vested remainder, whereas in this case it is imvos-
sible for a ~:randchild to haYe a vested remainder. In 
:n w that case tlie dead *grandchild wl10 was held to have 
had a vested remainder, was a lineal descendant of the 
lifo tenant. In our case ,J o]m Akin is not a lineal descendant 
of Blythe. Blythe had to die without lineal descendants be-
.fnn~ anybody else could come into the picture. 
ln ,Jameson v. ,Jmneson, 86 Va. 51. tl1e testator left a trust 
fopct to his daughter Elizabeth for life, '' and after her death 
the same is to be equally divided amonµ:st her surviving- chil-
tlr~n and the issue of such as may be <lend." Elizabeth had 
fom children. One of her children, Corbin, died before she 
did. The court held that Corbin's daughter Eliza took a 
vested remainder as soon as she was born. In that case it 
was possible to hold that Eliza had a vested remainder at 
birth even thoug·h hei· father did not have a vested remainder., 
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because, under the will, no other contingencies stood between 
Eliza and the legacy. In our case it is impossible to hold that 
John Akin liad a ves)ed remainder at birth, because, under 
the will of John P. Branch, there was the express e.ondition 
and contingency that, unless and until Blythe died without 
issue living at l1is death, no issue of a predeceased child of 
the testator could take anything at all. 
All will cases lay down the cardinal rule that the intention 
of the testator must control, and .Jameson v. ,Jameson is no 
-exception. The court said ( p. 56) : 
'' This question is one of intention, and the cardinal 
1J2* rule is to collect the *intention of the testator from the 
whole will taken together, without regard to anything 
-technical * * ""." 
Having said that, it was up to the court to think of some 
. 1·eason why the testator might have wanted to give a vested 
-remainder to Eliza although he unquestionably did not give 
n vested remainder to her father. To furnish that reason, 
the court quoted from an early Eng·lish case (p. 57): 
" 'It is said that there is no satisfactorv reason wlw a con-
dition of survivorship should attach to a parent and ~ot to a 
-child, a remark with which I cannot altogether ag:ree., for 
there is a very considerable difference in the positions of 
1Jm·ents and their issue. It is intelligible that ·a gift to chil-
dren Rhould be limited to those who survive the- tenant for 
life .• there being· a gift over to their issue; but, in the case of 
is~ue, why a share should be distributed among· surviving 
1ssnP-, p:iving nothing· to the representatives of those who may 
be dead, is not so clear. If all are to participate, any of 
them, in making· arrangements on marriage or otherwise, 
may rely upon this, that should he die before the share falls 
in his family will take it. This observation does not apply 
to the case of children under a condition that thev must sur-
vive the tenant for life, with sub~titutecl gifts to issue, be-
cause, notwithstanding the condition of survivorship, their 
families are provided for. On the construction that would 
limit the issue entitled to those who survive the tenant for 
]ife, the objects of the testator's bounty are placed in a posi-
tion which is not such as the testator would desire. To these 
considerations must be added the inclination of the court to 
avoid the suspense of shares as far as can be done consist-
ently with the expressed intent.ion.' '' 
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It will be observed tl1at the reasons there *suggested 
3341r as probably operating on the- minds of testators could 
not possibly have operated on the mind of l ohn P ~ 
Branch.. The gist of the reasoning is contained in the sen-
tence ref erring to the issue: 
"If all are to participate, any of them, in making arrange-· 
ments on marriage or otherwise, may rely upon this, that 
should he die before the share falls in bis familv will take· 
it." " 
W11en tl1a t reasoning is applied to the case of John Akin. 
Branch, it is obvious tllat nothing in thh; part of ,John P. 
Branch's will could help l1im '' in making arrangements on 
marriage or otherwise,'' because l1e still could not '' rely 
upon this, that should he die before the share falls in his: 
family will take it.'' Such reliance would be of no use in 
bis marriage settlements, because his chance to get the prop-
erty would still be conting·ent on Blythe's dying without is-
sue. ,John Akin could never by any possibility know or cal-
culate with any certainty tliat he was going to get the prop-
erty until he actually got it. 
Nor can the mere inclination of the law to avoid the sus-
pense of shares be invoked in the face of the clear ancl ex-
press condition precedent in the Branch will. 
Point ITT. 
The ,qift is to a class whose members cannot be ascertained 
until the dea.th of Blythe !W. Bra,n.c71. without issue. 
The will provides that in the contingencv that 
34* •Blythe "should leave no child, nor the issue ·of any 
child, him surviving,'' then~ · 
'' said principal snm slrnll pass and dei;;cencl to my own child 
or children then living, and the issue of such as may have 
died leaving issue, such issue to take w·r .~tirpe.c;.'' 
,Since the testator carefullv dh;crimi.nates in I1is use of the 
word "child" and the word ·"issueH it is necessarv to infer 
tl1at when he says "child" he does not mean "issue" and 
that when lie says "issue" he meam; "issue." Of course, 
the word ''issue'' includes children. ,,TJien the testator savs 
"but should he leave no child, nor tbe issue of any child:" 
the word ''issue'' includes the child of any child. It also 
includes g·randchilclren and great grandchildren ad infin-itirni. 
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Similarly, when he speaks of "my own • * * children (t 9 • 
and the issue of such as may have died,'' be clearly includes 
1mder the beading of ''issue'' children, grandchildren and 
HO forth of his own children. If, for exa~ple, ,Tohn Akin 
had left a child, grandchild or great grandchild, or combina-
tions thereof, it would be impossible to deny that those living 
at the death of Blythe would take per 8firpes, because the 
wiH expressly so provides. 
~rhe result of the lower court's decision is that John Akin 
in substance and effect has been vested with a power of ap-
pointment that his grandfather certainly did not give 
35$ him and clearly did not intend him *to have. Jolm Akin, 
even if be had been survived by a still-living son, could 
have left all of this property to the S. P. C. A., according to 
·the lower court's ruling. 
The lower court's ruling makes the word "issue'' synony-
mous with the word "child." It excludes grandchildren., 
This is one of the strongest reasons for saying that the ruling 
is plainly w_rong. -
If a testator displays his ignorance in bis will and shows 
that he thinks the word ''children'' means ''issue.'' the word 
''children" will be construed to mean "issue." ·· And if he 
thinks that ''issue" means children to the exclusion of grand-
children, it will likewise be so construed by the court. Here 
we have the opposite case. Here it is patent that the testator 
is familiar with words of art and knows the meaning of the 
word ''issue.'' The word ''issue'' in this will must accord-
jngly mean ''issue.'' 
In Tiffany v. Tho11ws, 1.68 Va. 31 at 36, the court- said: 
" '·~ * f.;c generally, ordinary words are to be given their 
usual and ordinary meanings, and technical words are pre-
snmed to have been used in a teclmical sense.' '' 
In 8niith v. Cliapmmi, 1. Hen. & M. 240, ,T udge Tucker said 
(p. 290): 
''That the words 'heirs,' 'issue' and 'children' are not 
synonymous, must be known to every man the least con-
versant with legal distinction.'' 
And at page 291: 
'' Every word is to he taken according to its nat?.tra.l and 
cornmon, import; and, if words of art are used, tl1ey are 
36>1+ to -be construed *according to the technical sense, un-
less upon the wl10le will it is plain that the testator did 
not so intend * * *. '' 
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In Tinsley v. Jones, 13 Gratt. 289. the court said (p. 292) : 
" 'Issue' is nomen colfoctivum, and a word of very exten-
sive import., embracing· the whole., line of lineal descendants 
* * '\ It is a technical word of established meaning, and 
must always have its effect accordingly, unless there be a 
clear munifestation of intention in the context to use it in the 
re~tricted sense of issue lh~ing at the death." 
Much of the reasoning of the court in Turner v. Monte-iro, 
127 Va. 537, is applicable to the present point. In that case 
th~ will used the word ''descendants,'' and some of the par-
ties !1r::rned that the testator meant "chi]dren" when he said 
"desce'iidants." ·vvhat the court there said about "descend-
ant~'' is equally applicable to ''issue,'' because the two words 
are synonymous. 
The court said (p. 544): 
"A descendant is an individual proceeding from an an-
~estor in any degree. It is synonymous with issue. It is off-
spring, near or remote. The word 'child' is not synonymous 
with the word 'descendant,' though a child is a descendant 
and a de~cem1ant may be a child; but a descendant may also 
proceed from an ancestor in the remotest as well as the near-
est degree. Ohvfously, this is not true as to a child." 
At page 547, t]w court said: 
"'Yhy'did the testator select the word 'descendants' t.o ex-
p1 ess his intention, if he really had in mind 'children'? He 
VC'l'Y well understood the use and meaning of the latter word, 
for he uses it in his will several times, in its ordinflry ac-
H7~ ceptation. If be intended his real *estate to go to their 
'children' at the death of the last of the two first takers, 
ns is contended, why did he becloud that intention, to no 
pm·nose and for no alleg·ed or conceivable reason, by tl1e use 
of the word 'descendants'? A person who has in mind 'chil-
d1<m' and 'chi]dren' only, is likely to say 'children,' in pref-
m·encc to usiug a word which embraces issue to the remotest 
degTee.' ' 
And a~ page 549: 
'' 'The word "descendants" comprises issue of every de-
g1:ee.' Neilson v. Brett, 99 Va. 677, 40 S. E. 32. 
'' 'Descendants in a will are equivalent to heirs of the 
body.' Mi.nor on Real Property, Vol. 1, p. 837. 
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'' 'Descendants are issue of every degree.' 2 Jarman on 
"'\Yills ( 5th ed.), pp. 98, 101. 
'' See also 13 Cyc., p. 1048, which defines 'descendant,' as 
an heir ju the direct descending· line, issue of the body. 
"In one case at least it has been held that 'descendant' 
does not mean child. See Cyc., p. 1048, note, in which the fol-
lowing· ruling is cited: 'In this case there is what appears to 
me to be a perfectly unambiguous word "descendants "-a 
word which I venture to say no layman or lawyer would use 
to designate children onl:lJ (italics supplied), and it is diffi-
cult to conceive any context by which the word '' descend-
ants" could be limited to mean children only.' " 
Therefore, we submit, it is clear that the word "issue" in 
the will of John P. Branch should not be limited to children, 
and yet the ruling of the Chancellor so limits it. 
The members of the class who are to take if Blythe dies 
without issue are described in the will as! 
''my own child or children then living, *and the issue 
38* of such as may l1ave died * * *.'' 
'I~he Chancellor has construed this to mean: 
"my own child or children then living, and the childrrm of 
such as may lmve died •:«< * #. '' 
John Kerr Branch was a child of the testator antl one ''of 
-such as mav have died.'' John Kerr's children were John 
Akin, Zayde and Louise. The lower court has held that those 
ch-ild-ren took vested remainders when .John Kerr died, there-
by excluding- gTandchildren. Since the testator used the word 
''issue'' instead of ''children,'' it follows that he had in mind 
th9.t some or all of the beneficiaries designated by him to 
take in t.hat contingency might, and probably would, turn out 
to he more remote descendants than children of his children. 
If .T ohn Akin had been suryived by children who were 1iving 
when Blythe died, the will unequiYocally commands that those 
children of ,John Akin should take per stirpes as issue of· 
,Jolm Kerr. 
The pattern, the purpose and tl1e languag-e of the testator 
throughout his will is to keep the property in the family: to 
lw11efit the lineal descendants., the issue, of the testator, the 
living and not the dead. 
The eonstruction we contend for is the only one that gives 
true effect to the meaning of the word ''issue." It likewise 
explains why the testator used the words "pass and de-
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sc.end.'' The Cha:ncellor has held ·tbat the share oi 
;39* *John Akin passed under the will of John Akin ancl 
that as soon as John Kerr died the property of John P .. 
Branch lost its capacity to "pass and descend" to the issue 
of the testator on the death of Blythe as the testator ex-
pressly directed. 
It is, we submit, cfoar that the testator had in mind that 
if Dlythe died without surviving issue (meaning lineal de-
scendants of Blythe) then the property was to g-o to a class. 
con·sisting- of the lineal descendants of the testator.. He de-
scribed bls lineal descendants as his own children tben living 
and the issue, if any, of such as may have drecl, per stfrpes. 
The gift is undeniably a gift to a class, and, since the mern-
lJers of the class cann.ot be ascertained nntil the date of' 
:Blythe's death, and, since it cannot be known until that date· 
whether this class will take anything or not, the membership 
in the class 1nust be ascertained as of tl1at elate. 
In Driskill v. Ca.rwile, 145 Va. 116 at 121, the court said: 
"That this is a gift to a class, the living children of the 
testator's brothers and sisters, appears manifest,, for it meets 
the accepted definition, namely, that it is 'a gift of an ag-
gregate sum to a body of persons, uncertain in number at 
the t.ime of the ~ift, to be ascertained at a future time, who 
are all to take in equal or some other definite proportions, 
the share of each being dependent for its amount upon the 
ultimate number.' 28 R. C. L., sec. 233~ p. 260. 
"Being a gift to a class, it is *necessary to determine 
40,)ic the time when the membership in that class is to be 
ascertained. Here, too, we have little. difficulty, be-
cause of the precedents. The general rule is, that the time 
for fixing the membership in a clasR taking under a wm is· 
the death of the testator; but whe1~e the distribution is to be 
made among a class at a time subsequent to the tetator 's 
decease., then only those who belong to the class when such 
time arrives are entitled to· share in the distribution. 28 R. 
C. L., p. 264, sec. 238; (;olUn v. Collin, 1 Barb, Chy. (N. Y.) 
630, 45 Am. Dec. 420; Gilliam v. OunrantJJ .1'rust Co., 186 N. 
Y. 127, 78 N. E. 697, 116 Am. St. Rep. 536; Thompson v. Gar-
wood, 3 Whart. (Pa.) 287, :n Am. Dec. 502; Col}gin 1 s .Appeal, 
124 Pa. St. 10, 16 Atl. 579, 10 A. ·R. R. 565. 
"In 40 Cyc. 1477, we find this statement of the rule., which 
is particularly applicable to this will: ,·where under the 
provisions of the will a gift to a class is poi:;tponed, either to 
a particular time or pending- the termination of a preceding· 
estate, as a rule those members of the class, and those only, 
take who are in existence at the arrival of tl1e time of dis-
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tribution, Rf? at the death of the life tenant, unless the par-
ticular language used confines the gift to those in existence 
at the testator's death, or who are in existence at the date 
of the- will.' '' 
The rule thus so clearly stated makes the property vest at 
ihe earliest possible moment, because, before t}Je moment 
(the death of -the life tenant) the membership of this ex-
plicitly designated class cannot be ascertained. The fact 
that the membership cannot be previously ascertained makes 
a gift to a class necessarily contingent. In the case at bar 
we have the added contingency that the class might never 
take the g·ift at all. 
In Callis v. Ripley, 161 Va. 472 at 475 the court said: 
41 * •"In the case of Driskill v. Carwile, 145 Va. 116, 133 
S. E. 773, testator gave certain real and personal prop-
erty to his sister and her husband for life, and at their de-
cease, directed the same to be sold and 'equally divided be-
t ween the living heirs of mv brothers and sisters.' 
"In construing this provision, it was held that the gift to 
'the living heirs' of the testator's brothers and sisters, was 
a gift to a class, it being· n gift to a hotly of persons uncer-
tain in number at the time of the gift, to be ascertained at a 
future time, who are all to take in equal proportions; and 
being a g:ift to a claRs only those are entitled to the estate 
who belong· to the class when the time arrives for its dis-
tribution.'' 
In Saitnders v. Saunders, 109 Va. 191 at 193, the court 
said: 
"Mr. Jarman on ,-vms (5th ed., Big;elow), 269, defines what 
constitutes a gift to a class as follows: 'A number of per-
son~ are popularly said to form a class when they can be 
designated by some general name, as "children," '' grand-
children," "nephews;" but in le.gal language the question 
whether a gift is to a class depends not upon these considera-
tiom; but upon the mode of the gift, namely, that it is a g·ift 
·of an aggregate sum to a body of persons uncertain in num-
ber at the time of the gift, to be ascertained at a future time, 
and who are to take in equal or in some other definite pro-
portion, the share of each being dependent for its amount 
11pon the ultimate number of persons.' 
"'In legal contemplation.,' says Page on Wills (J1Jd. 1901), 
sec. 540, 'a gift to a class is an aggTegate sum to a body of 
• 
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perRons uncertain in number at the time of the g·ift, to be 
ascertained at a. future . time, who nre to take in equal or 
some other definite proportions, the share of each be-
42* ing dependent for its *amount upon the ultimate num-
ber.' · · · 
''Mr. Jarman gives as mi illustration of what will consti-
tute a gift to a legal class, as distingushed from what is 
popularly said to form a class, the following·: 'A gift to 
A: B, and C and the children of D share and share alike is, 
• legally speaking·, a gift to a class, hut those persons would 
not, in the ordinary acceptation of the term form a class.' '' 
The foreg·oing· quotation shows that the members of a class 
need not be all related in the sam·e degi·ee to the testator or 
to each other. The children and the issue together ~onstitute 
the whole class of beneficiaries. Taken together they con-
Rtitute the issue of the testator. 
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that at least part 
of the class, the children of the testator, must be living at 
the death of the life tenant in order to take. The testator 
intended the whole class to take at the same time. He there-
fore intended the whole class to be ascertained at the same 
time. 
The situation in the instant case is like that described in 
J arneson v. Jameson, 86 Va. 51 at 56: 
''When the payment of a legacy is postponed to a period 
Ruh~equent to the decease of the testator, if futurity is an-
nexed to the substance of the gift, the vesting is sm~pended 
* * *. If the bequest :!(, * • is made contingent upon the hap-
penin2· of some future event at the death of the life tenant 
before the death of the legatee, the vesting, not the payment 
merely, is deferred, and consequently, when the legatee 
43'!) dies before * * • the contingency happens, the legacy 
~fails." 
1n the J a1neson, Case the will did not provide for any con-
tingency at the death of the life tenant. The remaindermen 
were certain to take 1when the life tenant died, and it was cer-
tain that the life tenant would die sometime. In our case 
the remaindermen could take only upon the condition prece-
dent and in the uncertain conting·ency that the life tenant 
~110uld die without issue him surviving·. 
In Tebbs v. Duval, 17 Gratt. 349, the will resembled our 
will in three material respects: 
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1. It left life estates to each of the testator's children fol-
lowed by cross remainders. 
2. It used the word ''then'' in tlJe same construction in 
which the word ''then'' is used in the will of ,John P. Brauch. 
3. It failed to repeat the words "living at his death" in the 
same way that our will failed to repeat the words "then liv-
ing.'' 
The language to be construed w~s ( p. 359) : 
"I give the above * * • to my son John Carr during his 
natural life, and then to his child or children., if any living 
:at his death; if none, to my daugl,lter Betsey Tebbs and my 
son William Carr during· life, and then to their children to 
be equally divided.'' 
Both John and William died without issue, so that the 
whole estate went to Betsey and her stock. The contest was 
between Betsey's children who survived her *and the 
44* representatives of those who predeceased her. 
There, as here, counsel for the deceased children laid 
great emphasis on the failure of the testator to repeat the 
,vorcls "living· at his death;'; and counsel for the living· chil-
dren placed great emphasis on the use of the word ''then." 
The court unanimouslv held that Betsey's children who 
survived her were entitled to the whole or" the fund in con-
tr('"\.'(•rsy, saying (p. 364): 
1
' I have already shown that there is nothing in the lan-
guage of these clauses inconsistent with the construction 
which restricts the word 'children,' in the latter part of them, 
to children living at the death of their parent. So far from 
it, the languag·e in the latter part of these clauses, seems to 
indicate that the testator in providing for children, had ref-
erence to a class of objects who should be in existence at the 
death of the parent. The testator, in each clause, g;ives prop-
erty to one of his own children for life, and then, that is, 
upon the deatl1 of the tenant for life, to his or her child or 
chi.ldren, if any then living, and if none, to the testator's 
other children for life, and then, tlrnt is, upon the death of 
said children, 'to be equally divided among their children.' 
This lang·uage seems to contemplate the· children provided 
for, a~ a class of persons to be in existence at the time of the 
division, so as to be able to participate in it. And it has 
lJeen held that where there is no gift to t11e objects, except in a 
dfrection to divide the subject among them upon the happen-
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ing of a particular event, only such can take as answer the 
description at the period of division, unless a contra:ry in-
tention can be collected from the will .. " 
The foregoing case closely resembles the case at bar .. 
45• The court in that case declined to resort to *technical 
rules of construction but found the meaning of the will 
by reading it. The court said (p. 361) : 
'' The counsel on both sides· have contended, that the con-
struction of this clause may be ascertained by the applica-
tion of certain general rules of law, which have been laid 
down in the construction of wills. 1 But I do not think it 
necessary to consider these general rules, or thefr applica-
tion to the present case. General rules of this sort often 
serve as guides for the· court when none can be found in the 
will. Where the will affords no E!atisfactory clue to the in-
tention of the testator, the court nmst, from the necessity of 
the case, resort to legal presumptions and rules of construc-
tion. But such rules yield to the intention of the testator ap-
parent in the will, and have no application where the inten-
tion thus appears. It seems to me that the intention of the 
testator, in the present case, may be ascertained from the 
will, without any resort to technical rules.'' 
There is another important point of similarity between 
that case and ours. As we have previously pointed out, the 
2nd and 3rd clanses of the will in our case use the same lan-
guage that appears in the later clauses, including the disputed 
clause. In the 2nd and 3rd clauses, the words '' then living'' 
are not repeated and yet it is clear from the context that the 
whole number of beneficiaries must be simultaneously living 
in order to take. 
In the cited case a similar state of facts appeared and the 
court said (p. 362): 
"Raving in the first part of the clause, defined precisely 
the class of bis grandchildren for which he meant to pro-
vide, out of the original share., l1e would naturally have in 
his mind the same intention in reference to what was 
46* to be added to that *share, or to go along with it, under 
the provision in the latter pa rt of the clause, and he 
might, by a very natural process, have dropped, in the latter 
part of the clause, the terms of description he had used in 
the former, without really intending any distinction. And 
this view is the stronger from the fnct, that the expressions 
we are considering are in such close connection with one an-
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other, being found in the same brief clause, and almost in the 
same line. 
"If it could be clearlv shown that the word 'children' is 
used in· other parts of the will or in any part of it, in a gen-
eral sense, as comprehending all the children which the tes~ 
ta tor's children might at any time have, there would be more 
foundation for an argument founded on the omission found 
in the latter part of these clauses, of the terms of description 
used in the former. For it might then be said that the testa-
tor had marked the distinction, by speaking of children gen-
erally, when he intended to include all. and adding terms of 
description when he intended to include only a part. But 
thi:::; cannot be done. On the contrary, the testator has, more 
than once, dropped the terms of description, 'living at the 
death,' &c., when his meaning clearly embraced them.'' 
CONCLUSION. 
The will of John P. Branch is not ambiguous and it is 
tl:erefore unnecessary to consider canons of construction or 
rules of presumption applicable to ambiguous wills. 
The testamentary intent is clear and manifest throughout 
the will and this polar star for the true interpretation of all 
wills should not be aJlowed to be clouded over by inapplicable 
rules of construction. 
47* *The remainders in the case at bar are necessarily 
contingent on the death of Blythe ,v. Branch without 
issue. The members of the class to take cannot be ascer-
tained before that event. The testator used the word "is-
sne" in its correct legal sense for the purpose of making 
certain that all of his lineal descendants in being· at the 
termination of the life estate should share his bounty. He 
provided expressly that: '' then said principal sum shall pass 
ancl descend to my own child or children then living, and the 
is.,m,e of such as may have died leaving issue, such issu.c to 
talce per stirpes." 
If children or more remote issue of ,Tohn Akin Branch 
were living today they would unquestiona hly be '' the issue'' 
of ,Tobn Kerr Branch entitled to share per stirpes in this 
whole fund. Yet the decree appealed from confers upon .T ohn 
Akin Branch, a predeceased grandson of the testator, power 
to appoint a part of that entire fund away from the natural 
objects of the testator's bounty, and ~'the issue" so clearly 
de8imated bv the testator as the final beneficiaries of hi.c: 
will.~ ·· 
,ve submit that the decree is erroneous and that the fund 
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should be divided beh~1ecm the appellants, the only issue of 
J olm Kerr Branch in I being· at the time of the passing-, de-
scending and vesting 1f the entire property in controversy. 
Respectfully submitted, 
.JOHN P. LEARY, 
RALPH T. CATTERA.LL, 
I Counsel for Appellants. 
48* *DECLARATIONS. 
l. Counsel for the lletitioners desire to state orally the 
reasons for reviewing: the decree complained of. 
2. Appellants adopt this petition as their opening brief. 
3. The undersigned 
I 
attorneys, duly qualified to practice 
in the 'Supreme Cour~ of Appeals of Virginia, certify that, 
in their opinion, the decree complained of ought to be re-
viewed. [ 
4. They aver that copies of the foregoing· petition were de-
livered to Stuart G. Christian, Esquire: and John T. ·wingo, 
Esquire, opposing cou~sel in the court below, on August 2, 
1943. I 
5. This petition is to be filed in the office of the clerk at 
Ricl1mol1Cl. 
,JOHN P. LEARY, 
Mutual Building: 
R.ichmond, Va. 
RALPH T. CATTERALL, 
.American Building·, 
Richmond, Va. 
Received August 2, 
1
1943. 
1'L B. 'WATTS, Clerk. 
Sept. 8, 1943. 
Appeal granted, and sitversedeas except as to part of final 
dccrre in favor of :Margaret B. Glasgow. Bond $500.00. 
c. v. s. 
I 
Received September! 9, 1943. 
M.B. vY. 
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RECORD 
VIRGINIA: 
Pl~as before the Judge of the Chancery Court of tbe City 
of Richmond, the 22nd day of May, 1943. 
Be it remembered that heretofore., to-wit: on the 14th day 
of September, 1942, came the complainants, by counsel, and 
sued out of the Clerk's Office of the Chancery Court, sub-
})Oenas in chancery against the defendants, directed to the 
proper officer and returnable to the Third Monday in Sep-
. tember, 1942, which subpoenas and the returns of the officer 
thtreon are iu due form. 
And at another day, to-wit: at rules held in the Clerk's 
Office on the Third Monday in September, 1942, came the 
-complainants, by counsel, and filed their bill, which bill is in 
the words and figures following, to-wit: 
BILL. 
J.Vfelville C. Branch and Robert G. Cabell, III, Trustees un-
der the will of John P. Branch, deceased, 
t'. 
Elsie L. Branch, Melville C. Branch and !filton ~T. Beirne, 
Executors under the will of John Akin Branch, deceased, 
et al. 
To the Honorable Brockenbrough Lamh, Judge of the Chan-
cery Court of the City of Richmond : 
Humbly complaining showeth unto your Honor your com-
plainants, ·Melville C. Branch and Robert G. Cabell, III, Trus-
tees under the will of John P. Branch, deceased, the follow-
~g ~~ = . 
pAge 2 ~ That heretofore., to-wit: in the year 1915, said 
John P. Branch died, leaving a last will and testa-
ment, which was duly admitted to probate in this honorable 
Court on the 4th dav of March, 1915; that on the same day 
.John Kerr Branch, ~the only Executor named in said will, 
dnlv qualified as Executor of said wil1 ; that said .John Kerr 
Branch and your complainant, Melville C. Branch, were by 
said will duly designated and appointed Trustees to execute 
I 
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certain trusts created thereunder; that thereafter, to-wit: iu 
the vear 1930, the said .~John Kerr Branch departed this life 
and· John Akin Braue~ was duly appointed and substituted 
as Trustee under said will in bis place and stead; that there-
after, to-wit, in the y~ar 1935, the said ,John Akin Branch_ 
having departed this lif,e, your eomplainant, Robert G. Cabell.r 
III, was duly appointed and substituted as Trustee under 
,mid will in the place llnd stead of said John Akin Hranch ; 
that your complainants have ever since acted and are now 
acting· as Trustees under t.he will of the said ,John .P. Branch,. 
decea·sed, as aforesaid;! and they file herewith, marked '' Ex-
hibit A with Bill 1 1, a ce!rtified copy of said will and of the ap-
pointments of said substituted Trustees as aforesaid, all of' 
which they r,ray will jbc here reucl and considered for all 
purposes as 1f herein s,t forth and fully and formally pleaded 
in all respects. 
The will of the said: J olm P. Branch, deceased, after cer-
tain specific devises ahd bequests, provides and directs as 
follows:. 
I 
'' 3rd. I will.I and direct that one half of the rest 
page 3 ~ and residue hf my whole estate not hereinbefore· 
disposed of, !shall be equally divided between my 
children living at my death, and the issue of such as may 
have died leaving· issu~, such issue to take per stirpes. 
"4th. The remainin6· one half of mv said estate not bere-
inbefore disposed of inl which shall be included my Merchants 
National Bank stock., iiy Richmond Fredericksburg and Poto-
mac Dividend obligatiorts and my Petersburg~ Savings and In-
surance Co. stock, at their Market valuation, I g·ive, bequeath 
anrl devise to my son ,John Kerr Branch and Arthur G. Glas-
gow IN TRUST, neve~·theless, to divide the same into four 
equal parts or portion~, one of which said parts or portions 
they shall hold in trust for the support and maintenance of 
my son, John Kerr Branch for and during the t.erm of his 
natural life, and the income and profits thence arising they 
shall pay over to my lsaid son quarterly, the -first payment 
to be made at the expiration of six months from the date of 
my death. 
1 
"I autl1orize and empower my son the said .John Kerr 
Branch if he shall have any child or ehildren, grand ehild or 
grandchildren great g+and child or great grandchildren liv-
ing; at his death, by hi~ last will and testament, to dispose of 
the principal sum herrin and hereby given in trust for him 
during- his natural life 1as he may, in that event determine, de-
sire and direct. 
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'' Should he not., in such case, by his last will and testa-
ment appoint and provide for tl1e disposition of the same, 
then I will and direct that at the death of my said son, the 
principal of the said sum so held in trust for him shall pass 
· and descend to such child or children as he mav 
page 4 ~ leave, him _surviving, and the h;sue of such as may 
have died leaving issue such issue to take ve·r 
stirpes; but should be leave no child nor the issue of any 
child, him surviving, then said principal sum shall pass and 
dr.scend to my own child or children then living, and the is-
sue of such as may have died leaving· issue, such issue to 
take ver stfrpes. 
'' 5th. One other of the snicl four equal parts or portions 
in the foregoing clause of this, my will, ref erred to and pro-
vided for, I give to me said son, John Kerr Branch and Ar-
thur G. Glasgow IN TR.UST, nevertheless, to hold the same 
for the support and maintenance of my said son.: Blythe W. 
Branch for and during· the term of his natmal life, and the 
income and profits thence arising· they shall pay over t~ my 
saicl son quarterly, the first payment to be made at the ex-
piration of six months from the date of my death. 
"I authorize and empower my son, the ~mid Blythe ,v. 
Branch if he shall have any child or children, gTandchild or 
grandchildren great grandc.hilcl or great grandcl1ildren liv-
ing at his death, by his last will and testament, to dispose of 
the principal sum herein and hereby g·iven in trust for him 
during- his natural life as he may in that event determine, 
desire und direct. 
,-~ Should he not, in such case, by his last will and testa-
ment, appoint and provide for the disposition of the same, 
then I will and direct that at the death of my Raid son, the 
prin~ipal of the said sum so held in trust for l1im shall pass 
and descend to such child or children as he may lemTe, him 
surviving·, and the issue of such as may ]1ave died leaving 
issne., such issue to take per stirpes :" but should he leave no 
child, nor the issue of any child, him Rurviving, 
page 5 ~ then said principal sum shall pass and descend to 
mv own child or children then living-, and the issue 
of such as may ]1ave died leaving issue, such issue to take 
per stirpes. 
'' 6th. One other of the said four equal parts or portions 
aforesaid, in t11e 4t11 clause of this my "fill referred to & pro-
vided for, I give and devise to my said son John Kerr Branch 
and the said Arthur G. Glasgow to 11ave and hold the same 
IN TRUST, nevertheless, for tl1e sole and separate use of my 
claug·bter, Effie Branch, for and dming- the term of her natural 
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I life, free from the debts or control of any husband she may 
hereafter have. \ 
'' The net income an4 profits thence arising they shall pay 
over to my said daughter quarterly; the first payment to be 
made at the expiration of six months from my death. 
"I authorize and en1power my daughter, the said Effie 
Branch if she shall haf e any child or children, grandchild or 
grandchildren g-reat grandchild or great grandchildren liv-
ing at her death., by h1er last will and testament, to dispose 
of the principal sum hJrein and hereby given in trust for her 
during her natural life, as she may, in that event determine, 
desire and direct. . 
"Should she not in !such case, ·by her last will and testa-
ment appoint, and prdvide for t]1e disposition of the same, 
then I will and direct that at tlle death of my said daughter, 
the principal of the s~id sum so held in trust for her shall 
pass and descend to stich child or children as she may leave, 
her surviving, and the issue of such as may have died, leav-
ing issue, such issue to take per sti'l·pes; but should she leave 
110 child nor the issue !of any child, her surviving, then said 
principal sum shall pass and descend to my own 
page 6 ~ child or children then living, and the issue of such 
. . as may have [died leaving- issue,., such issue to take 
71er stirpes. 
''7th. The remaining one fourth part or portion in the 
4th clause of this my! will referred to and provided for, I 
give and bequeath to 11my son, the said John Kerr Branch 
nnd the said Arthur G. Glasgow to have and to hold the same 
"IN TRUST, nevertheless, for the sold and separate -use 
of my daughter, l\far~aret Branch Glasgow for and during· 
the term of her natural life free from the debts or control 
of her present or any husband she may hereafter have. The 
net income and profits; thence arising they shall pay over to 
my said daughter guar~erly, the first payment to he made at 
Hie expiration of six n;ionths from my death. 
''I authorize and empower my daug·hter the said :Margaret 
Branch Glasgow if sh~ shall have any child or children or 
gTr~ndchild or gTandchiidren great grandchild or great g-rand-
el1i1<lren living at her, death, by her last will and testament, 
to dispose of the principal sum herein and herebv givem 
iu 1rust for her durin&' her natural life, as she may: in that 
Pvent, determine, desire and direct. 
"8houlcl she not, in I such case., by her last will and testa-
ment appoint and proyide for the disposition of the same, 
them I will and direct that at the death of my said daughter, 
the princ~ipal of the said sum so held in trust for lier shall 
pa8s and descend to such child or children as she may leave, 
Zayde B. Rennolds, et al .. , v. Elsie L. Branch, et al. 37 
her ~urviving, and the issue of such as may have died leaving· 
issue, such issue to take per stirves; but should she leave no 
,child nor the issue of any child, her surviving· then said prin-
cipal sum shall pass and descend to my own child or chil-
dren then living·, and the issue of such as may 
pag-e 7 } have died leaving- issue, such issue to take per 
sti?-pes.'' 
That by codicil No. 2 to said will, the testator revoked 
the appointment of said Arthur G. Glasgow as Trustee, as 
:aforesaid, and appointed said ::Melville C. Branch in his place 
.and stead. 
'l~hat at the time of the death of the ~aid ,John P. Branch 
be was survived by his four children named in said will, to-
wit, his two sons., John Kerr Branch and Blythe W. Branch, 
and two daughters, E.ffie Branch and Margaret Branch Glas-
g·ow, wife of Arthur G. Glasgow. 
That thereafter, to-wit, in the year 1930, the said John 
Kerr Branch died testate and survived by his wife, Beulah 
-Gould Branch, by his son, J olm Akin Branch, by his daugh-
ter, Zayde Branch Rennolds, wife of E. Addison Rennolds. 
and by his daughter, Louise Brane.11, and by no other issue; 
that thereupon the corpus of tl1e trust fund held for the said 
,John Kerr Branch as tenant for life, under the terms and 
vrovisions of the will of the said Jo]m P. Branch, deceased, 
pas~ed and was disposed of as provided in the will of the 
said John Kerr Branch. A certified copy of the will of said 
J olm Kerr Branch and the probate thereof, is herewith filed 
marked ''Exhibit B, with Bill", and prayed to be here read 
und considered for all purposes as if herein set forth and 
fulJy and formally pleaded in all respects. 
That thereafter, to-wit, in the year 1934, the said Effie 
Branch died testate, but without issue her surviving; ~hat 
thereupon the corpus of the trust fund held for the said Effie 
Branch as tenant for life, under the terms and provisions of 
~u.id trust established by the will of the said tT olm P. Branch, 
deceased, passed and was duly paid over and dis-
page 8 ~ posed of in accordance with the terms and provi-
sions of said trust as follows : 
One-third thereof to Blythe ·w. Branch, a son of the said 
.John P. Branch and who survived said Effie Branch: 
One-third thereof to Margaret Branch Glasg-ow, a daughter 
of the said John P. Branch and who survived said Effie 
Branch; . 
One-ninth thereof to ,John Akin Branch, a son of the said 
! 
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John Kerr Branch, thJretofore deceased, and who survived 
mid Effie: Branch; ! 
One-ninth thereof to: Zayde Branch Rennolds,. a daughter 
of said John Kerr Branch, theretofore deceased, ancl who 
had survived said EffielBranch; and, 
One-ninth thereof to fDouise Branch, a daug·hter of the said 
J olm Kerr Branch, th¢retof ore deceased} and who had sur-
vived said Effie Branch. 
I 
Thereafte1·, to-wit: in the year 1935, the ~aid J obn Akin 
Branch died testate a~d without issue. By bis last will and 
testament, which was quly admitted to probate in the Circuit 
Court of the County o{ Goochland, Virginia, said ,John Akin 
.Branch., after a few personal bequests whieh have long since 
bePn paid and satisfied~ left the entire rest and residue of his 
estate to his wife, Elsie L. Branch, absolutely a.nd in fee 
simple, and appointed( bis said wife, Elsie L. Branch, your 
complainant, Melville V. Branch, and Milton .J. Beirne, ]}xec-
utors of said will, whd duly qualified and acted as such. A 
certified copy of said will and the probate thereof is herewith 
filed marked '' Exhibit] C with Bill'', and prayed to be here 
read and considered for all purposes as if herein 
page 9 ~ set forth anq fully and formally pleaded in all re-
spects. . 
1 
That thereafter, to-~t, on tl1e 22nd day of May, 1942, the 
said Blythe W. Branch died testate, but without issue him 
surviving·; that thereu~on the corpus of the trust fund held 
for said Blythe ,v. Branch as tenant for life, under the will 
of the said John P. B11anch, deceased, passes and should now 
be paid over and disposed of by your complainants in ac-
cordance with the terms and provisions of said trust as pro-
vided in the will of th~ said .John P. Branch, deceased. 
That Margaret Bratnch Glasg·ow is the only child of the 
said .John P. Branch, deceased, who survived the said Blythe 
"\V. Branch and that the said Zavde Branch Rennolds and 
Louise Branch, daughters of the· said John Kerr Branch, 
are the onlv issue of Anv deceased child of the said .John P. 
Brancl1 who survived I tlie said Blythe ,Y. Branch; the said 
tT ohn Akin Branch, tlie only other child of said .John Kerr 
Branch, having· died i,1 the year 1.935, prior to the death of 
the said Blythe "\V. Branch. 
The terms and provisions of said trust of which said 
Blvthe Vl. Branch was tennnt for life under the will of the 
saicl John P. Branch, las hereinabove stated, are as follows: 
'' 5th. One other o£
1 
the said four equal parts or portions 
I 
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in the f oregc;>ihg clause rif this, . .tny. will, ref err eel to and pro-
vided for, I give to my said son, John Kerr Branch and Ar-
thur G. Glasgow_ IN TR.UST, .nevertheless, to hold the same 
for the support and maintenance of my said son, Blythe "\V. 
Branch for- ~nd during the term of his natural life, and the 
income and profits thence arising. they shall pay over to my 
. , said son quarterly, the first payment to b~ .made 
page iO ~ at the .expiration of six months from the date of 
. . my death: . . , 
"I authorize and empower my s911, .me said Blythe W, 
Branch if he shall have any child or children, grandchild ox 
g;randchildren .gTeat grandchild or .great grandchildren liv7 
ing at his death., by his last will and testament, to dispose 
of the principal sum herein and he1:eby given. in trust -for 
hjm during his natural life as he may in that event determine~ 
desire and direct. . . 
'' Should he not, in such case, by his last will and test~-
ment, appoint and provide for the dh,position of the same, 
then I will and direct that at the death of my said son, the 
principal of the said sum so held in trust for him shall pass 
and descend fo such child or children HS he. may leave, him 
surviving, and the issue of. such as may have. died leaving 
issue, such issue to 'trike per .stirpes ;- 'but. should he. leave no 
child, nor the issue of any child~ him sur.viving, .t1Jen said 
principal sum shall pass and descend to my own cbild or 
children then living, and tho issue of such as. may have died 
leaving issue, such issue to take per stirpes." 
That your complainants -a re advised that said Margaret 
Branch Glasgow., the only child. of said- ,John P. Branch who 
survived the said Blythe vV. Branch, thereupon became and 
is now entitled to receive one-half. of said trust fund last 
aforesaid, absolutely and in fee simple. · . . · 
That your complainants have been advised and. informed 
by tl1e said Zayde Branch Rennolds and Louise Branch, 
dang·hters of the. said John Kerr Branch, deceased, and bis 
only children who survived the said Blythe w·. Branch, and 
there being· 110 issue of any .de.ceased. child, that they are; 
. · 11pon a proper inter.pre.tation and construction of 
page 11 ~ the. terms and provisions· of s~id trust aforesaid 
. . under the will of the $aid tlohn P. Branch, de-
cem,ed, entitled to receive and have .paid over to them oue-
half, or an equal one-fourth each, of said trust fund afore-
said, absolutely and in fee simple. 
That your complainants have, on the other hand, been ad-
vised and informed that the said Elsie L. Branch in her own 
right as sole legatee and devisee, and as Executrix, under 
i 
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the will of said John lkin Branch, deceased, claims that the 
estate of the said J ohh .A.kin Branch, decea~ecl, is entitled, 
upon a proper interpretation and construction of the terms 
and provisions of saicli trust, aforesaid, established for said 
Blythe W. Branch as }ife tenant under the will of the said 
,John P. Branch, deceaf ed, to receive and have paid over to 
snicl Executors, or to ~aid Elsie L. Branch, one-third of the 
one-half of said trust fund claimed bv the said Zavcle Branch 
Rennolds and Louise Branch., as hereinabove stated, and that 
the Executors of the ~aid John Akin Branch, deceased, de-
sire to submit said daim for determination bv the Court 
herein. I •· 
That said trust fund aforesaid, presently held by your 
complainants and w]4ch your complainants are advised 
Rhould now be paid over and distributed to the perRons en-
titled thereto, consists! of the following· cash anc1 securities, 
to-wit: · 
Cash 26.30 
5,740 First & Merchants National Bank of Richmond, Va. 
stock / 
11 Riverside & Dan River Cotton }fills preferred stock 
243 Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. common stock 
248 Cont~nental Insurance Company stock 
page 12 ~ $8,000 U. S. Treasury 4%-B%, 1943-1945 bonds 
1,500 U. S.: Treasury 31,4 1944-1946 bonds 
2,500 U. S. Treasury ~% 1955-1960 bonds 
100 Consolidated Etlison Co. of N. Y. Preferred stock 
79 Schenley Disti11er Corporation $5.50 Preferred ( Cu-
mulative) sto.ck 
69 V\Tesson Oil-Snowdrift $.00 Preferred stock 
36 Public Service/ Corporation of N. ,J., 7% Preferred 
stock. j . 
rrhat the value of said securities is approximately $250,-
000. I 
That your complain~nts are advisC'd and believe, and there-
fore allege., that in view of the conflicting claims aforesaid 
:md particularly in vfew of the position occupied by your 
camnlainant, Melville g. Branch, as co-trustee under the will 
of the said ,J olm P. r1:'ranch, deceai;;ed, and as one of the 
Exc~cntors under the will of the said .John Akin Branch, de-
cen~ed, and his duty to act with complete impartiality in the 
lH'Cmises, as well as for the protection of your complainants 
in the execution of said trust and to the end that the claims 
of all parties interesircl in and/or claiming any right, title 
\ 
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'Or interest in and to said trust fund, aforesaid, may be 
finally and completely established, adjuclg<~d and determined, 
your complainants are entitled to ask and receive the guid-
.ance and direction of this honorable Court as Trustees as 
aforesaid. 
·wHERE-FO.RE, your complainants pray that they be al-
lowed to file this, their bill of complaint., and the Exhibits 
therewith; that Elsie L. Branch, Melville C. Branch, and 
:Milton J. Beirne, as Executors of the will of ,John Akin 
Branch, deceased, Elsie L. Branch in her own 
page 13} right, Zayde Branch Rennolds, Louise Branch, and 
:Ofarg·aret Branch Glasgow may be made parties 
clef endant to said bill and required to answer the same, but 
not under oath, answers under oath being hereby expressly 
waived; that the terms and provisions of the trust created 
and established for Blvthe Vv. Branch as life tenant under 
the will of ,John P. Brancl1, deceased, may be properly inter-
pretecl and construed; that the rights and claims of all par-
ties hereto in said trust may be established, declared and 
adjudicated herein; that your complainants may have the 
g;uidance., direction and protection of the Court in the ex_ecu-
tion of said trust aforesaid and in the proper disposition of 
Raid trust fund; that your complainants be granted all such 
·other, further and more general relief as may be necessary 
and proper in the premises. 
_l\.ncl your complainants will ever pray, etc. 
PAGE & LEARY, 
MELVILLiJ C. BRANCH 
ROBERT G. CAB}JLL, III. 
Counsel for complainants. 
EXHIBIT ''.A'' FILED ·wrTH BILL. 
PagP One ~ I, J olm P. Brancl1 of Richmond, Virginia, 
J. P. B. ~ hereby revoking all other wills or testamentary 
papers by me heretofore at any time made, do 
make this my last will and testament in manner and form, 
·as follows; that is to say: 
1st. I give and devise to my daughters Effie Branch and 
- Margaret Branch Glasgow all of my household 
page 14 ~ and kitchen furniture, both useful and ornamental 
including· my china, g-lass, plate and plated ware, 
pictures, engravings, books, mirrors, etc, in the house and 
I 
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on the lot known as. No 1 ,~rest Franklin Street Richmond, 
Va wherein and whereon I now reside, together with the: 
following strips or pa1rels of land~ adjoining the lot afore-
said., to wit : / 
The nine and one half feet .or thereabouts, of land, that I· 
uow owi1 on Franklin Street between the house and lot afore-
said, and the property pf my neighbor .J olm. A Coke running 
. back about ope hundred and sixty two feet; and 
Page 2 ~ also th~ sixte, en feet of land on Foushee Street,. 
J.P. B. ~ situated South of the aforesaid lot No 1 ·west 
. Franklin Strfct, and North of the property of 
Grace Church and rm;ming back and ,vestwardly about 
ninety two feet; I 
The first of which stHps or parcels -of land I bought from 
..... and the second of which sa.id ships or parcels of land I 
bough- from ...... , should they die without issue, the per-
sonal and real pro pert~ aforesaid, in tbis clause· of my will 
specified, bequeathed, Jiescribed -and devised, shall pass and 
descend to my two soni:; (Blythe Vv alker and -J olm'. Kerr Branch. 
This bequest and devise is _Made in order substantially to 
attach and annex the 1real estate herein devised to the lot 
. afore said known as No -1 West Franklin Street as 
Page 3 } part and pa*el thereof to the end that it and the 
J.P. B. ~ personal prope1·ty embraced herein, May pass, de-: 
scend and belong to the same parties to w110m the 
house and lot aforesaid was devised by my wife, the late 
llf. L. M .. Branch by her lust will and testament .dulv recorded 
in the Clerk's Office o~ the Ghancery Court of the City of 
Richmond, Va; and under the same limitations. , 
page 15 ~ 2nd. Tl1e !rest and residue of the real .estate 
owned by me individually, I will and direct shall 
be sold and the proceeds be equally divided between my ehil-: 
dren living at my death, and the issue of 13u~h as may have 
previously died leaving issue, such issue to take per stir1Jes;. 
and in order to facilitiite this division I hereby authorize my 
I • • Executor. l1ereinafter pfnned, to sell the same or any part 
thereof, .. froni .-time to 
I 
time either- publicly or privately, for 
cash or on credit, as he may deem best; and until such sale or 
sales, to collect and divide the net rents, issues and profit!:\ 
thereof amongst the Rarties thereto entitled; the- purchasex 
or purchasers thereof ,not to be 1·esponsible for the ~tpplica-; 
tion of or the division of the purchase money· or the 
Page 4 ~ rents, issue~! and profits aforesaid. 
J.P. B. ~ 3rd I will and direct that one half of the rest 
ancl residue / of nrv whole estate not hereinl)efore 
disposed of, shall be , equaliy clivicled between my cllildreu 
Zayde B. Rennolds, et al.,, v. Elsie L. Branch, et al. 43 
living at my death, and the issue of such as may have died 
leaving· issue, such issue to take per stirpes. 
4th The remaining one half of my said estate not herein-
before disposed of in which shall be included my Merchants 
National Bank stock, My Richmond ~.,redericksburg and Poto-
mac Dividend obligations and my Petersburg 1Savings and 
Insurance Co Stock, at their market valuation, I give, be-
queath and devise to my son John Kerr Branch and Arthur 
G. Glasgow IN TRUST, nevertheless, to divide the same into 
four equal parts or portions, one of which said parts or por-
tions they shall hold in trust for the support and 
page 16 ~ maintenance of my son, .John Kerr Branch for 
and during· the term of his natural life, and the 
Page 5 ~ income and profits thence arising· they shall pay 
'-T. P. B. ~ over to my said son quarterly, the first payment 
to be made at the expiration of six months from 
the date of my death. 
I authorize and empower my son the said ,John Kerr Branch 
if be shall have any child or cl1ildren, grand child or grand-
children great grandchild or great grandchildren living at 
his death, by his last will and testament, to dispose of the 
principal sum herein and hereby given in trust for him dur-
ing his natural life as he may, in that event determine, de-
sire and direct. 
Should he not, in such case, by his last will and testament 
appoint and provide for the disposition of the same, 
Page 6 ~ then I will and direct that at the death of my said 
J, P. B. ~ son, the principal of the said sum so held in trust 
for him shall pass and descend to such child or 
children as he may leave, him surviving·, and the issue of 
such as may have died leaving· issue such issue to take per 
stirpes; but should he leave no child nor the issue of any 
child, him surviving, then said principal sum shall pass and 
descend to my own child or children then living·, and the is-
sue of such as may have died leaving issue, such issue to take 
pet· stirpes. 
5th One other of the said four equal parts or portions in 
the foregoing clause of this., my will, referred to and pro-
vided for, I give to my said son, John Kerr Branch and Ar-
thur G. Glasgow IN TRUST, nevertheless, to hold the same 
for the support and maintenance of mv said son, Blythe W. 
Branch for and during the term of his natural 
page 17 } life, and the income and profits thence arising 
they slmll pay over to my said son quarterly~ the 
Page 7 ~ first payment to be made at the expiration of six 
J.P. B. ~ months from the date of mv death. 
I authorize and empower my son, the said Blythe 
I 
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\V. Branch if he shall have any child or children, grandchild 
or grandchildren great grandchild or great gTandchildren 
Jiving at his death, by lhis last will and testament, to dispose 
of the principal sum herein and hereby g·iven in trust for 
him during his natural !life as he may in that event determine, 
desire and direct. 1 
Should he not, in. su~h ease., by his last will and testament, 
appoint ai1d provide fbr the disposition of the same, then I 
will :rnd direct that at ~he death of my said son, the principal 
of the said sum so he'd in trust for him shall pass and de-
scend to such child or children as he may leave, 
Pag·e 8 ~ him surviving, and the issue of such as may have 
.J.P. B. ~ died leaving! issue, such issue to take per stirpes; 
but should he leave no child, nor the issue of any 
ehild, him stii·viving·, t4en said principal sum shall pass and 
desP-eiid to my own child or children then living, and the 
issue of such as may have died leaving issue, such issue to 
take per stirpes. I 
6th One other of the said four equal parts or portions 
aforesaid, in the 4th cl~use of this my will referred to & pro-
vided for., I give and devise to my said son John Kerr Branch 
and the said Arthur G. Glasgow to have and hold the same 
IN TRUST, !nevertheless, for the sole and separate 
Page 9 ~ use of my daughter, Effie Branch, for and during 
J.P. B. ~ the term of !her natural life, free from the debts 
or control of anv husband she mav hereafter have. 
page 18 ~ The net income and profits thence arising they 
shall pay oyer to my said daughter quarterly; the 
first payment to be niad.e at the expiration of six 111onths from 
mv death. I 
·1 authorize and empower my daughter the said Effie Branch 
if she shall have any child or children, grand child or g·rand-
children great grandchild or great grandchildren living at 
her death, by her lasti will and testament, to dispose of the 
piincipal sum herein and hereby given in trust for her dur-
ing- her natural life, as she may, in that event determine, de-
sire and direct. 
Should she not in S1'Ch case, by l1er la~t will and testament 
nppoint., and provide for the disposition of the same, then I 
,yill and direct that ~t the death of my said daughter, the 
principal of the said sum so held in trust for her 
Pa ~·e 10 ~ shall pass and descend to such child or children 
.J. P. B. ~ as she may leave, her ~urviving·, and the issue of 
such as ma~ have died, leaving issue, such issue 
t:0 tnke ver stirves; out should she leave no child nor the 
ir,;sue of any child, hJr surviving, then said principal sum 
s]rnll pass and descend to my own ehild or children then liv-
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ing, and the issue of such as may have died leaving issue, 
such issue to take per stirpes. 
7th The remaining· one fourth part or portion in the 4th 
clause of this my will referred to and provided for, I give . 
. and bequeath to my son, the said John Kerr Branch and the 
said Arthur G. Glasgow to have and l10ld the same 
IN TRUST, nevertheless., for the sold and separate use of 
my daughter, Margaret Branch Glasgow for and during the 
term of her Natural life free from the debts or 
page 19 } control of her present or any husband she m~y 
hereafter have. The net income and profits 
Page 11 } thence arising they shall pay over to my said 
.J.P. B. } daughter quarterly, the first payment to be made 
at the expiration of six months from my death. 
I authorize and empower my daughter the said Margaret 
Branch Glasgow if she shall have any child or children, or 
grandchild or grandchildren great gTandchild. or great grand-
·children living at her death, by her last will and testament, to 
·di~pose of the principal sum herein and hereby given in trust 
for her during her natural life, as she may, in that event, de-
termine, desire and direct. 
S110uld she not, in such case, by her last will and testament 
appoint and provide for the disposition of the same., then I 
will and direct that at the death of my said daughter, the 
p1·inr.ipal of the said sum so held in trust for her shall pass 
and descend to such child or children as she may leave, her 
surviving, and the issue of sucl1 as may have died 
Png·e 12 } leaving issue, such issue to take per sti rpes; but 
J.P. B. } sl1ould she leave no child nor the issue pf any 
child, her :surviving then said principal sum shall 
vass and descend to my own child or children then living, and 
the issue of such as may have died leaving issue, such issue 
to take per stirpes. 
8th I will and direct that upon the request in writing- of 
·either of my said sons or daughters in the four preceeding 
clauses of this my will mentioned, approved by one of the said 
tmstees therein mentioned, to wit: My son, the said John 
Kerr Branch, or the said Arthur Q. Glasgow that 
J)age 20 ~ any of the stocks, bonds, or other securities held 
by said trustees at any time, in trust for him or 
lier, respectively shall be sold, and the proceeds thereof re-
. invested as he or she may request and desire, the 
Pag·e 13 ~ substituted, investments to be held by said trus-
~T. P. B. ~ tees on the same trusts and limitations as herein 
before set out, which said trusts I have created 
and declared not from any -:want of confidence in any of my 
I 
I 
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children, but solely to the end that I may, if possible 
~ secure to them a lreasonable support .. ~ 9th., I 1·equest [ that my son the ~aid John Kerr 
..S ..g Branch and the said Arthur G .. Glasgow shall not be-
~ ~ required to give1 any security as trustees. as herein 
lt:) f before appointe~r, and I dir~ct th, at they shall :ueceive 
S ~ no compensation for their services except five ( 5) per 0 • ~ ~ cent on the income from time to time derived from 
J"C A the said b·ust fu11d, the same to be equally divided be-;"§ iween the two trustees aforesaid. 
a~ 10th I appointimy son John Kerr Branch the execu-5 tor of this ~y wip, and re.q1:1cst that he :M:~y be· allowecl 
to qualify wi1t.hout g1vmg any security or retum-
Page 14 ~ ing· any inv,entory of my estate I give him the 
tT- P. B. ~ g·ood will and name of the firm of Thos .. Branch 
& Co and inlconsideration thereof. I direct that he: 
shall charge nothing Jnd receive no compensation fo1· his 
services as :Executor ~s aforesaid. 
11th 'Should either of the trustees hereinbefore appointed 
and designated in the ~th clause of this my will die, fail or 
refuse to act as such, pr if, for any reason having accepted 
said trust eiither of said trustees should .resign or 
page 21 ~ be removed, /or become incapable of or disqualifiecl 
. from executing the same, then it is my will and 
desire that the chance11y Court of the City of Richmond, Va,. 
shall upon petition of ~ majority of my children living when 
sucl1 vacancy arises or lis created fill the said vacancy as they 
may nomin~te and request; and I further desire 
Page 15 ~ that no security shall be required of the trustee 
J.P. B. ~ or trustees Jso substituted as aforesaid. 
In witness whereof I liave hereto set mv hand 
and seal this fourth day of May in the year nineteen bundrecl 
and eleven. 
JOHN P. BRANCH (Seal) 
Signed, sealed, published and declared by the testator,. 
,John P. Branch, as and for his last will and testament in the 
presence of us who in [his presence and at his request and in 
the presence of each other have hereto subscribod our names 
us witnesses thereof, I the words "her present or" on tlie 
tenth page having be;en interlined before the same was 
executed. !. E. VANDERSLICE, 
M. C. BRANCH, 
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Codicil # one to my will of May 4th, 1911. I do hereby 
revoke that part of Clause Eleven (11) with reference to the 
appointment of a trustee by the Chancery Court of the City 
of Richmond and do hereby authorize and Empower the re-
maining trustee uniting with a majority of my children living 
to appoint such trustee, the above is written in my own hand 
writing. ,vitness my hand and seal this 10th day of May 
1911. 
.JOHN P. BRANCH (Seal) 
Witness 
G. E. VANDERSLICE. 
page 22 ~ Oodi~il #2 to my last will and testament dated 
May 4th 1911. I do hereby revoke that part or 
parts of my will appointing Arthur G. Glasgow to act as 
Trustee and do hereby appoint ~·folville C. Branch in his 
place and stead upon the same te1·ms and conditions 
·witness my hand and seal this 22nd day of April, 1912. 
JOHN P. BRANCH (Seal) 
"\fitness 
.JOHN AKIN BRANCH, 
BLANCHE FLIPPO. 
CODICIL NO. 3 TO nIY LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT 
DATED MAY 4TH, 1911. 
I hereby give, bequeath and devise to my son, Blythe W. 
Branch, the sum of One hundred & fifty Thousand Dollars, 
with simple interest at the rate of 3% per annum from the 
date hereof until the date of payment; said sum to be paid 
in cash to my said son at my death. 
The said sum of money is to be paid to my said son in ad-
. dition to whatever bequests I have made in my said will, or 
any codicils thereof. 
In witness whereof I have hereunto set mv hand and seal 
tl1is 8th day of Jany. 1914. r 
JOHN P. BRANCH (Seal) 
Signed, and sealed in the presence of the u11dersig1iecl. 
EFFIE BRANCH 
ROBERT G. CABELL. 
I 
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I 
page 23 ~ Virginia : 1 
In the Chancery CouH of the Citv of Uichmond, the 4th 
D!y of March, 1915. 
! 
A. paper writing bepring date the 4th day of :May, 1911, 
and three codicils thei'cto attached numbered one, two and 
three, and dated resp~ctively, :May 10th, 1911, April 22nd, 
1912., and January St~, 1914, purporting to be the h~st will 
and testament of John Patterson Branrh, deceased, late of 
this City, were this day produced to the Court by Legh R. 
Page, attorney for ,J olm Kerr Branch and offered for proof. 
~rhe said paper wri~ing dated May 4th, 1911, consists of 
fifteen pages of manuJscript and attested by G. E. Vander-
slice, M. C. Branch and R. G. Cabell as witnesses, who, being 
first duly sworn for tlie pmpoRe, deposed and said, that the 
said paper writing was sig·ned, sealed, acknowledged and 
c1£•clared by .John Patteson Branch as and for his last will 
nnd testament in theirlpresence, and they,, at his request, and 
in bis presence, and ini the presence of each other, subscribed 
their names thereto as witnesses; and that at the time said 
paper writing bears date, the testator was of sound mind 
aud memory, and thekr further deposed that they are well 
acquainted with the l{andwriting of the said ,To]m Patteson 
Branch, deceased, having frequently seen him write, and that 
the words on the margin of page thirteen opposite paragraph 
nine and reading "changed from 5% to 3% John P. Branch", 
i8 wholly in the handwriting of the · said John Patteson 
Branch, deceased. I . 
· And the said codicil~ numbered one and two bearing· elates 
respectively l\fay 10th, 1911 and April 22nd, 1912, 
page 24 ~ were fully proved by the oaths of George E. Van-
derslice anp R. G. Cabell, who., being first duly 
sworn for the purpose, severally deposed that they are well 
acqnainted with the l~andwriting of the ::;aid .J olm Patteson 
Bl'ancb, deceased, having frequently seen him write, and that 
the said two codicils, together with the signature thereto, are 
wholly in the handwriting of the said .John Patteson Branch, 
deceased, and they futther depo::;ed that at the time said two 
eodicils bear date th? said John Patteson Branch was of 
Hound mind and memqry. 
And the said codicil numbered three bearing· date the 8th 
day -of January, 1914,, was fully proved in all respects to the 
~fltisfaction o~ the c4urt by the oath of Robert G. Cabell, 
one of the subscribinr witnesses thereto-Effie Branch the 
,, 
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other subscribing witness thereto, being physically unable 
to attend Court, or to testify iu the matter. 
Thereupon the said paper writing· bearing date the 4th day 
-0f May:, 1911, together with the marginal note on page 13, 
:and hereinbefore described, and the three codicils ·:thereto 
:annexed, bearing dates respectively, May 10th, 1911, April 
22nd, and January 8th, 1914, are established, and taken to-
gether are ordered to be recorded as and for the true last 
will and testament of the said .John Patteson Branch, de-
-ceased. 
And on the motion of John Kerr Branch, the only Executor 
named in said will, he was permitted by the Court to qualify 
as such; and thereupon he made oath as the law directs, and 
entered into and acknowledged a bond as such Executor in the 
JJenalty of Four Million Dollars, payable and conditioned 
according to law, but without security, the said 
page 25 } will directing that none should be required of him.. 
And certificate is g-ranted the said J olm Kerr 
Branch for obtaining· a probate of the said will in due form, 
And at another date, to-wit: On the 31st day of October, 
1930. 
ln the Matter of the Estate of ,John P. Branc]J, deceased. 
It appearing from the will of John P. Branch, deceased, 
1ate of this City, duly admitted to probate in this Court on 
the 4th day of March, 1915, that J·olm Kerr Branch and Mel-
ville C. Branch were designated and appointed Trustees. to 
administer certain trusts created by said will, and it also ap-
J>euring that authority was conferred upon the remaining 
tmstee uniting with a majoritv of the testator's living chil-
dren to appoint a successor, should for any reason, a va-
·cancy oe:cur in said Trusteeship. 
Thereupon tl1is day came Melville C. Branch, Surviving 
Trustee under the last will and testament of .J olm P. Branch, 
deceased, Blythe ,v. Branch, Effie Branch and :Margaret 
Branc11· Glasgow, the last three of whom are the only living 
cl1ildren of said .John P. Branch, deceased, and by a writing 
under their hands, nominated ~Tohn Akin Bran~h as one of 
the trustees under the will of tTohn P. Branch, deceased, in 
the place and stead of .John Kerr Branch, deceased, and 
moved the Court to permit him to qualify as such Trustee. 
And the Court approving the nomination and appointment 
of .John Akin Brancl1, Trustee, so made under the terms of 
the will of John P. Branch, deceased, doth permit him to 
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Thereupon I John Akin Branch appeared in open 
page 26 ~ Court and accepted the said trust., and entered 
into and acknowledged a bond ns such Trustee in 
the penalty of Two Million Dollars, payable ancl conditioned 
according to law, but w~thout security, the said will directing 
that none should be re~uired of him. 
And at another date, to-wit: On the 30th dav of December 7 
1935. I V 
In Matter of Estate of ~olm P. Branch, deceased,. appointing: 
Trustees for and und~r his will. 
It appearing from the will of John P. Branch, deceasedr 
late of this City, duly ~dmitted to probate in this Court on 
· the 4th day of March, 1915, that John Kerr Branch and Mel-
ville C. Branch were dbsignated and appointed Trustees to 
administer certain trusts created by said will, and it also 
nppearing that authority was conferred upon the remaining 
Trustee uniting with a imajority of the testator's living chil-
dren to appoint a sucdessor, should, for any reason, a va-
cancy occur in said Tr1tsteeship, and a vacancy having here-
tofore occurred, and the surviving Trustee exercised the 
right of appointment by tlle substitution of J obn Akin Branch 
as one of the Trustees : in the place and stead of ,John Kerr 
Branch, deceased, as will appear from order herein of Octo-
ber 31, 1930, Order Bocj>k 129, page 226. 
And it further app~aring to tlle Court tlmt J obn Akin 
Brancl1 has departed tliis life now this day came Melville C. 
Branch, the surviving Trustee under the last will and testa-
ment of tTohn P. Branch, deceased, Blythe vY. Branch and 
Margaret Branch Glasgow, the only surviving-
page 27 ~ children of the said tT olm P. Branch, deceased, and 
by a writingj under their hands, nominated Hobert 
GamlJle Cabell, III, as .one of the Trustees under the will of 
said John P. Branch, : deceased, in tlie place and stead of 
John Akin Branch, decieased. 
And tlrn Court apprqving· the nomination and appointment 
of Robert Gamble Cabe[!, III, so made under the terms of the 
will of said ,John P. Branch, deceased, doth permit him to 
qualify as such TrusteJ. 
Thereupon Robert Gamble Cabell, III, appeared in open 
Court, and accepted the said trust, and entered into and 
acknow leclged a bond ~s such Trustee in the penalty of Two 
Million Dollars, paya ~~e and conditioned according to laW;. 
but without security, the said will directing that none should 
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lJe required of the original Trustees and those appointed and 
qualifying under authority of the said will. 
And at another date, to-wit: On the 8th day of July~ . 
1942. 
Virginia: 
In the Clerk's Office of the Clmncery Court of the City of 
Richmond, the 8th day of July, 1942. 
In Matter. of qualification of Administrator cl b. u. c. t. a. 
of the estate of John Patteson Branch, deceased. 
It appearing that John Kerr Branch who qualified in the 
Chancery Court of the City of Richmond on the 4th day of 
March, 1915, as Executor of the last will and testament of 
J olm Patteson Branch, deceased, has departed this life; on 
the motion of Margaret B. Glasgmv, a distributee, the Clerk 
doth appoint John P. Leary as Administrator, 
page 28 ~ with the will annexed of the estate of John Pat-
teson Branch, deceased, unaclministered by the 
said .John Kerr Branch, Executor, deceased. 
Therenpou John P. Leary this day appeared in the Clerk's 
Office, made oath as the law directs, and together with Ameri-
can Surety Company of New York, his surety,_ by Otis M. 
Alfriend, its duly authorized attorney-in-fact, which first 
justified on the oath of its said attorney-in-fact as to its suf-
ficiency, entered into and acknowledged a bond as such Ad-
ministrator in the penalty of Sixty Five Thousand Dollars., 
payable nnd conditioned according· to law. 
And certificate is granted John P. Leary for obtaining let-
ters of administration on the estate of John Patteson Branch, 
deceased, unadministered by ,John Kerr Branch., Executor, 
deceased, with the will of the said John Patteson Branch an-




ALBERT' T. AUGUST, Clerk, 
A. T. AUGUST, Clerk. 
i 
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I 
1.>age 29 ~ EXHIBIT f'B" FILED 'WITH BILL. 
Being of Sound mil)d and in the name of God-Amen-I 
declare this to be my last ·wm and rrestament. Revoking all 
Codicils and ·wills herbtofore made. 
I g-ive to my beloved wife Beulah Gould Branch all my 
Reaf' Estate and houses with their contents including my 
Villa in Florence. I 
I give to each of my grandchildren E. A. Rennolds, '-Tr., 
Beulah Rennolds, Zayde Gordon Reunolds, and John Kerr 
Branch Rennolds, the fs~1m of twenty five thousand dollars to 
b,~ invested for them, the principal and accrued income to be 
paid to them on their 1twenty fifth birthday. 
I give to my son J ?hn Akin Branch the name of Thomas 
Branch & Co. which 'Yas given to me by my F·ather .John P. 
Branch. , 
The remainder of my property I wish divided into two 
equal parts one half otf which is to be divided into four equal 
parts and to be held ih Trust for my wife and three children 
each to receive one fourth with right to will to those having 
issue surviving-, othc1fwise the right to will is void and the 
property held in Tru~t to be returned to my estate and to 
descend to my child reµ per stirpes. 
The remaining· half/ to be divided between my wife Beulah 
and my son ,John Al~in., my daughter Zayde, wife of E. A. 
Rennolds~ and my daughter Louise. My wife to receive forty 
per eent and each of my three children twenty per cent. 
I appoint as Executors my son J oJm Akin 
pag~ 30 ~ Branch, my two cousins l\folville C. Branch and 
Robert G. [Cabell and request that the Court re-
quire no bond-I also appoint my son John Akin Branch 
and Melville C. Branqb, and Robert G. Cabell to act as Trus-
tees in the Four Trusts herein created. The income from the 
Trusts to he paid toi the Beneficiaries quarterly. .A.ny va-
caucies fo the TrusteJs to be filled bv the Court with consent 
of the Beneficiary and one Trustee (not a Beneficiary) I fur-
ther direct that the !Beneficiary acting with two Truste~s 
shall have the poweri to change the investments from time 
to time as to them m~y seem wise, and to make investments 
iu ~ecuritfos and other property than those defined as legal 
investme11:t n.nder thej Laws of the State of Virginia, and the 
Trnstees actmg toge~ber shall have the same powers. 
I further direct and empower the three Trustees or their 
successors herein named to lend to Thomas Branch & Co., 
Riehmond, Va., witl~out security the sum o.f any part of 
Seventy five thousand dollars for each of the four Trust 
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Estates created under this will. The total of said loans not 
to exceed three hundred thousand dollars in the aggregate, 
said loans or renewals thereof to run for a period not ex-
ceeding four years from the date of my death and to bear 
interest at tl1e rate of four and one half per cent per annum 
payable quarterly. . 
·witness my hand and seal to this my last will and testa-
ment written wholly in my own handwriting this 31st day of 
.January, 1928, at Richmond, Va. 
JOHN KERR BRANCH (Seal) 
JJag·e 31 } Virginia : 
In the Chancery Court of the City of Richmond, the 29th 
Day of July,, 1930. 
A manuscript paper writing bearing date the 31st day of 
.. January, 1928, purporting· to be the last will and testament of 
John Kerr Branch, deceased, late of this City, was this day 
produced to the Court and offered for probate. 
And it appearing to the Court that the said ,John Kerr 
Branch was a legal resident of the City of Richmond, and 
that he departed this life on the 1st day of July, 1930, in 
.. Florence, Italy; Milton J. Beirne and G. E. Vanderslice, com-
petent witnesses residing in the said City of Richmond, be-
ing first duly sworn, severally testified that they were not 
interested in, or a, beneficiaries under the said wil1, that they 
nnd eaeh of them were well acquainted with the said ,J obn 
Kerr Dranch, deceased, during his lifetime, familiar with 
his handwriting, having frequently seen him write, and that 
the whole of the said paper writing, including the signature 
thereto is wholly in tl.1e handwriting of the said .J olm Kerr 
Eranch deceased, that he wa.s at all times of sound mind and 
memory and capable of making a will. 
Thereupon the said paper writing· bearing date the 31st 
day of .January, 1928, is fully established and ordered to be 
rtJcorded as and for the true last will and testament of the 
said J olm Kerr Branch, deceased. 
On the motion of the Executors named in said will, they 
wer() permitted by the Court to qualify as such; thereupon 
.John .Akin Branch, Melville C. Branch and Robert 
page 32 ~ G. Cabell, named in said will as Executors thereof, 
appeared in open Court_, made oath as the law 
54 Supreme ~ourt of .App-eals of Virginia; 
directs, and entered into and acknowledged a bond as such 
Executors in the pena~ty of Eight Millio~ Dollars, payable-
and conditioned accorcljing to law,. but without security, the-
said will directing that none should be required of them. 
And certificate is graµted the said .J olm Akin Branch, Mel-
ville C. Branch and Ror,ert G .. Cabell for obtaining a probate 
of the said 'will in due (rm. 
A.nd at another day, to-wit: On the 30th day o.f Decembers-
1935. . 
In Matter of Estate ~f John Kerr Branch, deceased. Ap-
pointing Trustees uq.der his will.. 
It appearing from the will of John Kerr Branch, deceased,.. 
late of this City,, duly )admitted to probate in this Court on 
the 29th day of July, l930, that J obn Akin Branch, Melville 
C. Branch and Robert G. Cabell, Ill, were designated and 
appointed Trustees to administer certain trusts named in 
said will, and it furier appearing that. said John Akin 
Branch, one of the Tr stces named in said will, has departed 
this life, and that und. r the terms of said will, any vacancy 
in the Trustees to be nlled by the Court with the consent of 
tQ<3 beneficiary and on~ Trustee; and thereupon this day came 
Melville C. Branch anti Robert Gamble Cabell, III, the sur-
viving Trustees, and Beulah C. Branch, Zadie B. Rennolds 
and Louise Branch, b~neficiaries under said will, by a writ-
ing under their hands and nominated. E. Addison Reynolds 
as one of the Trustees under the said will of .John Kerr 
Brancb, deceased, in ttje place and stead of l olm Akin Branch, 
deceased, and moved the Court to permit I1im to 
pag-e 33 ~ qualify as such Trustee. . 
A.nd the I Court approving the nomination and 
appointment of E. Atldison Rennolds- so made under the 
terms of the will of s~id ,John Kerr Branch, deceased, cloth 
permit him and MelvHJe C. Branch and Robert Gamble Cabell 
III as Trustees. to administer the trusts created under the 
will of John Kerr Branch, deceased. , 
Thereupon Melvillej C. Branch, Robert Gamble Cabell Ill 
and E . .Addison Rem,olds, appeared in open Court and ac-
Cf-pted the said trusts, and., tog·ether with the United States 
Fidelity and Guaranty Company, their surety, by E. Leslie 
Spence, .Junior, its duly authorized attorney-in-fact (the 
Court hcing first satilfied, however, from an examination of 
t.he said E. Leslie Spetice, J~nior, on oath, as to the sufficiency 
of said Company) entered mto and acknowledg·ecl a bond as 
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such Trustees in the penalty of Two Hundred Thousand 




CHAS. O. SA VILLE, Clerk, 
A. T. AUGUST, Clerk. 
EXHIBIT '' C'' FILED ·wrTH BILL. 
I, J"OHN AKIN BRANCH, being of sound mind, declare 
this to be my last Will and Testament, revoking all previous 
,Yms. · 
1st. I desire all my funeral expenses and just debts paid 
as soon as practical. . 
page 34 ~ 2nd. I leave to my nephew, Edmund Addison 
Rennolds Jr., the two (2) pearl studs which were 
given to me by my Uncle, Blythe ,v. Branch. 
3rd. I leave to my niece, Beulah Branch Rennolds, the 
sum of one thousand dollars ($1,000.). 
4th. I leave to my uiec.e, Zad;l}e Gordon Rennolds, the 
sum of one thousand dollars ($1,000.). 
5th. I leave to my nephew, John Kerr Branch Rennolds. 
{a) A set comprised of n pair of cuff links, three (3) eve-
ning waistcoat buttons and three (3) evening studs: Mother 
of Pearl surrounded by diamonds. 
(b) My gold Vacheron Constantine evening watch. 
(c) lVIy Pearl and Platinum Watch Chain. 
( d) The sum of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.) 
6. I leaYe to my Cousin, Melville C. Branch, the three (3) 
pearl studs, which were willed to me by my ~-randfather, 
tT ohn P. Branch. 
7. I leave to my sister Zayde Branch Rennolds, the portrait 
of my Great Grandfather Akin, which was willed to me by 
my Grandmother Gould. 
Sth. I leave to my sister, Louise Branch, my gold and 
platinum cigarette case. 
nth: I leave to my servant., Isham Harris, if he be in my 
employ at the time of my- death~ the sum of two hundred and 
fifty dollars ( $250.). 
10th. I leave to my servant, Clarence .Jones, if 
page 35 ~ he be in my employ at the time of my death, the 
sum of one hundred dollars ($100.). • 
i 
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11th . .All the rest anµ residue of my Estate, I leave in fee 
simple to my dear wi1ie, Elsie Lindsey Branch. 
12th. I did not leavi anything to my dearest -:Mother, my 
Aunt and my Uncle for all whom I bave the deepest love and 
a:ff ection, feeling sure that they would desire me to leave my 
P-ffects as designated, 'mt request that my wife give to each 
of them some personal! remembrance of mine. 
I hereby appoint my wife, Elsie L. Branch; my cousin, 
Melville C. Branch and Milton .J. Beirne, as mv Executors 
and desire that no bo~d be required of them. ., 
Witness my hand ~nd seal this 18th day of December 
1934. : 
j JOHN AKIN BRANCH (Seal} 
Signed, and sealed by John .Akin Branch in the presence 
of each of us., who havb signed this will at his request and in 
his presence, who states that this is his last ·wm and Testa-
ment. I 
,vitn~ss: G. }J. VANDERSLICE 
·witness: CH.ARLES F. "WILKINSON. 
State of Virginia : / 
In the Office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court of the County 
of Goochland on the 1st day of November 1935. 
The last will and tebtament of .John Akin Branch, late of 
the said Cqunty of Goochland, deceased, bearing· 
page 36 ~ date the l8t~1 day of December, 1934, was this day 
produced before the Clerk of the said Court for 
proof, and the said will was proved by the oaths of G. E. 
Vanderslice and Char:
1
[es F. ,vnkinson the two subscribing 
witnesses to the same. 
"\Vbereupon it is ordered that the said will be established 
as the true last will and testament of John Akin Branc.h, 
deceased, and that the I same be recorded as suc.h. And on the 
motion of Melville C. lBranch, Milton J". Beirne and Elsie L. 
Branch, the Executors: in the said will named, who made oath 
thereto according to law and entered into and acknowledged 
a bond in the penalty of Nine Hundred and Seventy Five 
thoui;:and and Five h~ndred ($975,500.) conditioned accord-
ing to law (but without security the testator in his will di-
recting that none be required), which said bond is ordered 
to he i:ecorde~. j • • • 
Certrfi.cate 1s granted tlle said Melville C. Branch, l\iilton 
• J. Reime and Elsie L.! Branch for obtaining a probate of the 
said will in due form. 
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~Tohn Sloan, C. B. Valentine, T. Darnley A.damson, R. T. 
March Jr., and H. T. Richeson are appointed appraisers of 
the decedent's real and personal estate, any three of whom 
being first duly sworn for the purpose will appraise the same 
.and return their appraisement to the Commissioner of Ac-
.counts of this Court. 
Given under my hand as Clerk of the Circuit Court of the 
County of Goochland, Virginia, this the 1st day of Nov. 1935. 
Teste: 
P. G. MILLER, Clerk. 
pag·e 37 } State of Virginia 
County of Goochland, to-wit: 
I, Margaret K. lVIiller, Clerk of the Circuit Court of the 
. County of Goochland, in the State of Virginia, do hereby 
certify t]rnt the foregoing· is a full and complete copy of the 
last will and testament of John Akin Branch, 
late of the County of Goochland, aforesaid 
( Court Seal) deceased, with the probate thereof, as the 
same remains on file and of record in this 
office. 
In Testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and 
affixed the Seal of said Court at Goochland Courthouse, this 
the 27th day of August, 1942. 
MARGARET K. MILLER, 
Clerk of the Cireuit Court of Goochland 
County, Virginia. 
DECREE OF OCTOBER 8, 1942. 
This day came the defendants, Zayde Branch Rennolds and 
Louise Branch, by their attorneys, and tendered their an-
swer to the bill of complaint herein and asked leave of Court 
to file the same, which leave is accordingly granted and said 
imswer ordered filed . 
.ANSWER OF ZAYDE BRANCH RENNOLDS AND 
LOUISE BRANCR, FILED UNDER DECREE 
OF OCTOBER 8, 1942. 
Tl1e defendants, Zayde Branc]1 Rennolds and Louise 
Branch, for answer to the Bill of Complaint filed 
page 38 ~ herein, or to so much thereof as they are advised 
it is material for them to answer, answer and say: 
That they are advised and believe the matters and things 
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stated and shown in said Bill and in the Exhibits therewith: 
:filed herein are true a;nd correct; that they are further ad-
vised and believe; and, therefore, allege that they are en-
titled to receive and httve paid over and/or delive:recl .to them. 
an equal one-fourth e~ch of the trnst fund he1~etofore and 
now held by the Complainants as Trustees under the will of 
said John P. Branch for said Blvthe "\V. Branch for life, un-
der and in accordance 1 with the terms, provisions- anrl condi-
tion::; of said trust. 
vVHEREFORE, these defendants concur in the prayer of 
said Rill of Complaint and further pray that it oo declared,. 
adjudged and decreed that these defendants a re entitled to 
receive and have pa~d over and/or delivered to them an 
equal .one-fourth each /of said trust fund aforesaid .. 
And now having fully answered, these defendants pray to 
be hence dismissed with their reasonable costs bv them in 
this behalf expended. I .A.nd they will ever pray, efc. 
iAYDE BRANCH RENNOLDS 
LOUISE BRANCH. 
By PAGE & LEARY, 
i their attorneys .. 
PAGE & LEARY, p. f · 
page 39 ~ DECREE OF NOVEMBER 24, 1942. 
On motion of Elsie[_ Branch, Melville C. Branch and Mil-
ton .J. Beirne as execbtors under the last will and testament 
of .Tohn Akin Branch~ deceased, and Elsie L. Brancl1 in her 
own right, the order i pro con/es.so entered at rules against 
them is set aside andi leave is granted them to file their an-
swers to the bill of ¢omp~aint ~.and thereupon .the joint and 
several answers of· t~e said defendants are tlus day filed. 
JOINT AND SEVER.AL ANS"\VERS OF ELSIE L .. 
BRANCH, :MELVILLE C. BRANCH AND MILTON ,J. 
BEIRNE, AS EXECUTORS UNDER THE LAST 
WILL AND TE~TA1\1IENT OF ,JOHN AKIN BltANCH,. 
DECEASED, A~D ELSIE L. BRANCH., IN HER. 0"7 N 
RIGHT, FILED1 UNDER Dli}CREE OF NOVEMBER 
24, 1942. 
The joint and sev~ral answers of Elsie L. Brancl1, Mel-
ville C. Branch and ~Iilton .J. Beirne as executors under the 
last will and testament of J olm Akin Brancl1, deceased, and 
1 
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of Elsie L. Branch in her own right, to the bill of complaint 
exhibited against them and others by Melville C. Branch and 
Robert G. Cabell, III as trustees under the last will and 
testament of John P. Branch, deceased. 
These defendants, reserving to themselves the benefit of 
all just exceptions to said bill of complaint, for answer 
thereto, or to so much thereof as thev are advised it is ma-
terial they should answer, answer and say : 
That they are advised and believe tbnt the matters and 
· facts stated and alleged in the said bill of com-
page 40 ~ plaint are true and correct and that the exhibits 
filed therewith are true and correct copies of what 
they purport to be. 
The defendant Melville C. Branch, being a]so co-trustee 
undP.r the will of John P. Brancl1, deceased, and as such one · 
of the plaintiffs in this cause, desires and prays that he may 
he excused from taking a definite position in this suit as to 
the proper interpretation and consttnction of the last will 
and testament of John P. Branch, deceased. 
F1or further answer to the said bill of complaint, the other 
two executors under the last will and testament of John 
.A kin Branch, deceased, Elsie L. Branch and Milton .J. Beirne, 
and also Elsie L. Branch in her own rig·ht, say that they are 
advised and believe and therefore allege that under a proper 
interpretation and construction of the terms and provisions 
of the last will and testament of ,John P. Branch, deeeased, 
the executors under the will of John Akin Branch, deceased, 
are entitled to receive and lmve paid and delivered to them 
rm equal one-sixth portion of the trust fund mentioned in the 
bill and heretofore held by tl1e plaintiffs as trustees under 
the will of John P. Branch., deceased, for Blythe W. Branch 
for and during the latter's life, and now held by them for 
distribution under and in accordance with the terms, provi-
sions and conditions of the said will of J o]m P. Branch, de-
ceased, and the said two last named defendants pray that it 
may be so declared, adjudged and decreed. 
"Wherefore, all these defendants concur in the prayer of 
the bill of complaint that the terms and provisions 
page 41 r of the trust created and established for Blythe W. 
Branch as life tenant under the will of John P. 
Branch, deceased, may be properly interpreted and construed 
by this court. 
And now having fully answered these defendants pray 
that. after their rights shall have been determined l1erein, 
they may be lience dismissed with their reasonable costs by 
I 
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them in this behalf eX}Jended. Aud they will ever pray, etc. 
ELSIE L. BR .. L\.NCH 
MELVILLE C. BRANCH and 
MILTON J. BEIRNE, 
Executors under will of John 
.Akin Branch, deceased, and 
Elsie L. Branch in her own 
I right 
ry srrUART G. CHRISTIAN JOHN T. WINGO, 
, their attorneys. 
STIPULATION OF
1 
FACTS, FILED UNDER DECREE 
OF MAY 22, 1943. 
It is stipulated and I agreed by and between counsel, whose 
signatures are signed h~reto, that the matters and facts stated 
and alleged in the bill ·of complaint filed in this cause are true 
and correct and that i the three exhibits filed therewith arP 
true and correct copies of what they purport to be and it is 
further stipulated and agreed that the following additional 
facts are true and c01+ect and mav be considered in evidence 
as if duly proven by competent witnesses: 
page 42 ~ That Jolin P. Branch, at the time he made his 
will, in the I year 1911, had four children, two sons, 
Blythe ,v. Branch and John Kerr Branch, and two claug·h-
tcrs, Effie Branch and Margaret Branch Glasgow; aged re-
spectively, 47., 46, 44 and 35 years; and he had four grand-
children, J olm Akin Branch, Zayde Branch Rennolds, and 
Louise Branch, child1teu of his son, John Kerr Branch and 
Marjorie Glasgow, a 1hild of his daughter, l\Iargaret Branch 
Glasgow, aged, respecpvely, 23, 19, 11 and 8 years; that these 
W()re all of his ebildren and grandchildren., and that all of 
th~m were alive at the time of his death in the year 1915; 
that the wives of his said sons and the husband of his daugh-
ter, Margaret Branct~ Glasgow, werealso alive at said times; 
thn t the said Blythe f. Branch had no child born of this, his 
cmly marriage; that tlie birth dates of the children and grand-
rhildren of J olm P. B1ranch were as follows: 
Blvthe vV. Branch 
Joim Kerr Branch 
Ef1ie Branch 
1 Margaret Branch Glasgow 
,Jolm A.kin Branch 
horn Marc.h 16, 1864 
born May 15, 1865 
born August 18, 1866 
born November ... , 1876 
born August 19, 1887 
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Zayde Branch Rennolds 
Louise Branch 
bom May 16, 1891 
born February 25, 1900 
born November 8, 1902 Marjorie Glasgow 
May 10th, 1943. 
page 43 ~ 
PAGE & LEARY 
Attorneys for :Melville C. Branch and Rob-
ert G. Cabell, III, Trustees under the will 
of John P. Branch, deceased 
JOHN P. LEARY 
Attorneys for Zayde Branch Rennolds and 
Louise Branch 
STUART G. CHRISTIAN 
.JOHN T. WINGO, 
Attorneys for Elsie L. Branch, Melville C. 
Branch and Milton J. Beirne, Executors 
under the will of ,John Akin Branch, de-
ceased, and for Elsie L. Branch in her 
own right. 
OPINION OF THE COURT. 
tTolm P. Branch died in 1'915, leaving· a will dated May 4, 
1911, and certain codicils which are not l1ere material. 
By the 4th clause of the will he left a certain portion of 
11is estate to trustees, directing them to divide it into four 
-equal parts to be held and administered as four separate and 
distinct trusts, one for the benefit of each of the testator's 
four children for life. These trusts are in all .material re-
spects identical; and, since the questions now presented con-
eern the devolution of the trust created for the testator's son 
Blythe vV. Branch., its provisions will now be outlined. 
Tbis trust is to be held for the benefit of Blvtbe Vv. Branch 
for his life and the income paid to him quarterly. If Blythe 
W. Branch die survived by a child, a grandchild or a g-reat 
grandchild l1e is given a general and unlimited power of ap-
l)Ointment by his will to direct the disposition of the remain-
der in this trust; but if he die so survived and fail to exercise 
the power of appointment, then the remainder shall pass to 
liis children who survive him and the issue per stirpes of 
such of his children who may have died leaving issue. 
Blythe W. Branch died on May 22, 1942, leaving 
pag·e 44 ~ no issue. Therefore the testamentary power of 
appointment never came into being and the dispo-
sition directed of the remainder in the event mentioned never 
became operative. In the event which did occur., that is., the 
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death of Blythe W. Bvaueh without issue, the devolution of 
the remainder in this trust is governed by the following pro-
vision of the will, quotl'd exactly from the original: 
"* ,;,. * but should h leave no child, nor tl1e is-sue o-f any 
child, him surviving·, then the said principal sum shall pass 
and descend, to my own child or children then living, and tlie-
issue of such as may have died leaving· issue, such issue to 
take per ,,tirpes." '. 
The questions pres~nted involve the proper constru~tion 
of the provision just :quoted in the events w·hich l1ave oc-
curred. These events 1are: 
The testator's four Jhildren, life tenants in the four trusts., 
were John Kerr Branch, Effie Brancl1, Blythe ,V. Branch 
and Margaret Branch Glasgow, all of whom survived the-
testator. Three of these children, that is, all of them except 
Mrs. Glasgow, have si:h.ce died as follows: 
In 1930 John Kerr hranch died testat'e, survived by three 
children, John Akin Branch, Zayde Branch Rennolds ancl 
Louise Branch. The trust fund in which he enjoyed a life 
estate under his fatl~! r's will thereupon passed under the 
will of John Kerr Br nch, the circumstances giving him full 
power of appointment, which he exercised. 
In 1934 Effie Branch died without issue and 
page 45 ~ the1·eupon the trust fund of which she was life-
tenant devolved, under the clause of her father's 
wil1 identical with thJ one aboYe quoted, ver stirpes to her 
living brother., her li~ing sister and the children of her de-
ceased brother, John J;(err Branch.. This was in accord with 
the· express language . of the will, no such question as now 
presents itself arising-II in the factual situation which tllen ob-
tained. 
In 1942, as has bee! said, Blythe "\Y. Branch died without. 
issue. A.t the time of !his death the factual situation was dif-
ferent in this respect, namely, John Akin Brauch, the son of 
John Kerr Branch, Ju~.d dieq. in the year 19H5, without i ssne 
but leaving a will in ft· vor of his widow, Elsie L. Branch. It 
is observed that J olm Akin Branch, grandson of the testator, 
survived his father, . olm Kerr Branch, and his aunt, Effie 
Branch, but predeceas,ed his uncle, Blythe "\V. Branch. 
It is the devolution of the remainder in the Blythe ,v. 
Branch trust fund un~ler the quoted provision of l1is father's 
will which here, concers the Court. It is not questioned that 
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the testator's daughter :Margaret Branch Glasgow is en-
titled to one-half of this remainder; being a child of the tes-
tator and having survived her brother Blythe W. Branch, 
she clearly qualifies under the express language of the will. 
It is the devolution of the other half of this remainder that 
is now to be determined. 
These are the competing claims: The two living sisters 
of John Akin Branch assert that they, being the only issue 
of the testator's deceased son ,John Kerr Branch who sur-
vived their uncle Blythe ,v. Branch, are entitled to that other 
lmlf of this remainder in equal shares, that is, one-fourth 
each; that they alone come under the description "the issue 
of such as may have died leaving issue, such issue 
page 46 ~ to take per sti,rpes"; that their brother John Akin 
Branch, having· predeceased Blythe vV. Branch and 
having left no issue, he and his portion have been blotted 
out; that under a p·roper construction of the will no issue of 
a deceased child of the testator can be a taker unless such 
iss1ie shall have survived Blythe "'\V. Branc]1, the lifetenant. 
On the other hand the widow of .J o]m Akin Branch, who is 
the beneficiary under his will~ contends that the estate of John 
Akin Branch is entitled to its proper fraction of this other 
half of the remainder; that it should devolve in three shares, 
one to the estate of J olm Akin Branch and one to each of his 
two living sisters; that John .Akin Branch at the time of the 
death of his father "leaving· issue" was one of the issue so 
left; that the requirement that to be a taker the claimant · 
must survive Blythe W. Branch, the lifetenant, thoug·h ex-
pressly applicable to children of the testator by the presence 
in the will of the qualifying words "then Jiving", is not ap-
plicable to issue of deceased childreii; either expressly ·Or by 
any implication found in the will; that instantly upon the 
death of his father, John Akin Branch qualified as a remain-
d~rman in this share; and that the rig·ht of himself if Jiving· 
or of his estate if dead to take as such could be defeated onlv 
by an event which never occurred, namely, the birth to Blvthe 
,v. Branch of issue who should survive him. 
Pains have been taken to state the facts, the provision of 
the will and the respective contentions as plainly and suc-
cinctly as possible. As frequently happens such 
page 47 ~ a statement in and of itself, in the opinion of the 
Court, points to the inevitable conclusions with-
out involving precedents and authority; it is a truth often 
alluded to that authorities are more numerous than illuminat-
ing; as aids to the proper construction of a will. 
If the disputed clause said-
I 
I 
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'* * • then the said principal sum shall pass and desceud to 
my own issue then living·, such issue to take pc1· stirpes', 
I 
so that the adjectival Jlhrase '' then living" would be plainly 
applicable to all posst,ble rcmaindermen; or if it said, with 
words added (italiciz,d.) 
'• :ff: • then the said principal sum shall pass and descend to 
my own child or children then living, and to the issue then 
living of such as may have died leaving issue, such issue to 
take per stirpes',-
there would be no co1itroversv and the will would doubtless 
never have come into court foi· construction. The contention 
of the two surviving sisters of .J olm Akin Brancli would then 
he plainly rig·ht unde11 the express language of the will. 
But the condition df taking· imposed by the words ''then 
living," tl1at is, living at the death of Blythe ,v. Branch, is 
not thus made applicable by the will as 1wriften to the issue 
of a deceased child of the testator, as it is in the language 
supposed by the Cou~t; nor are the words '' then living,'' 
which in the will as wfitten modify "child or children" only, 
repeated (as the Court has suggested) and by 
page 48 ~ repetition made applicable also to the issue of the 
testator's child or cl1ildren. 
The Court is not a~ liberty thus to rewrite the will. The 
Court can but c.onstrue the words of the testator as used by 
him. He has with res~ect to his own children expressly made 
survivorship of the litfetenant a condition, failing which his 
ehildren cannot be remaindermen. This he does bv inserting 
the inexorable words i "then living" as one of the qualifici-
tio!lS his children must possess. But when he states the 
qualifications for the i~sue of his children he significantly, and 
apparently deliberate~y, omits. this qualification or condition; 
indeed, he appears content to mention another, and a much 
Jess drastic, condition, namely, that such issue need only 
survive their own parent-" as may have died leavin._q issue." 
Unless this phrase f 'leaving issue'' bears this connotation 
of time, that is, surviving· the parent, it has no meaning; tbe 
cla 11se would have the same result if "leaving issue'' be 
omitted. For if there be no issue to take, then there can be 
110 fakers. If the clause be read with these two words omitted 
tlw noint will be app~eciated. 
Finding no expresrion or implication here or elsewhere 
1 within the four corneirs of the will to the contrary, the Court 
i~ of the opinion that! the members of the class described as 
''issue" of a deceased child of the testator are to be deter-
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mined at the most reasonable and appropriate point of time; 
that is, at the death of their ancestor, the testator's child. 
rl'his is the earliest reasonable time to determine this class, 
unless express language or clear implication de-
page 49 ~ mand otherwise; for at any earlier time the class 
may be incomplete. No sound reason is suggested 
for going counter to the announced policy of Virginia favor-
ing early vesting, or early ascertainment of members of a 
class, by postponing the time beyond the death of the parent 
-0r ancestor of the issue to be selected as takers. 
The Court the ref ore holds that the class ''issue'' here is 
·composed of the issue of John Kerr .Brancl1 as they existed 
.at the death of John Kerr Branch; and that there were three 
members of the class., one of whom was John Akin· Branch, 
Rince deceased. 
It is not considered necessary to the decision to name the 
·precise and technical legal estates of the potential remainder-
men. To paraphrase Mr. Justice Hudgins' expression on 
page 401 of 178 Va. (Jmnes v. Ba.nk, 178 Va. 398): ''The 
·controlling question to be determined is whether the remain-
dermen should be ascertained at the time of the death of 
their ancestor, the testator's deceased child, or at the time 
·of the life tenant's death.'' This is paraphrased because 
]1ere it is impossible to choose the earlier time,-the faYorite 
time in Virginia,-the moment of the testator's death. The 
lJest we can do is to choose, in accordance with the estab-
lished policy of this State, the earliest time practicable under 
the provisions of the will to be construed. 
If called upon to do so the Court would specify the technical 
estates whicl1 existed at and after the death of ,John Kerr 
Branch as follows: A remainder vested in rig·ht in John 
Akin Branch, subject to be divested upon the h1-
11age 50 ~ tervention of a condition subsequent,-the birth of 
a child to the lifetenant, Blythe W. Brancll. We 
need not specify further; because the divesting· contingency 
11ever occurred and the remainder continued vested in right 
until it fell in upon the death of the lifetenant; and it then 
ripened into enjoyment for the remainderman 's lawful suc-
,cessors in title. 
This conclusion appears to find ample support in the au-
thorities. In Jameson v. Jamesmi, 86 Va. 51, the testator's 
children were required to survive the lifetenant in order to 
qualify as remaindermen; but no such condition of survival 
was imposed upon the issue of a deceased child. This ac-
c.ords with this Court's holding in the instant case. Sustain-
ing Rimilar constructions of wills more or less similar are 
nliinerous other cases, some cited in the Jameson case and 
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many others found byi the industry of counsel and cited in. 
the briefs. It is considered thai a more minute examination 
and analysis of the al!tthorities would merely expand this. 
opinion to an unreasonable and unnecessary length; espe-
cially in view of the fµct that the conclusions here reached 
have been aTrived at jather bv a close consideration of the 
particular wili and re-qection 11pon its language than by fol-
lowing the guidance· of precedents. The authorities have· 
served the purpose here of confirming· the Court in its con-
clusions by demonstrating· tbat man~r judges have reached 
the same result in con~trning other wills that ha,re much in 
common with the langttage he1·e construed. 
It should be added,! however, that one strong line of au-
thorities has been given the most thoughtful con-
page 51 ~ sideration df the Court and has afforded an ap-
proach and) a basis for these conclusions. Allu.:.. 
sion is made to that liri.e of Virginia cases culminating in Mr. 
Justice Hudgins' opinion in James v. Peoples National Bank 
(1941), 178 Va. 398, a~d lVIr. lustice Browning's opinion in 
.4.merican National B~nk and Trust Company v. Herndon 
(1943), 181 Va. Adv. Shts. 17, which announce and adhere to 
'' the safest and soundest construction'' and policy, namely, 
the early vesting· of ~states, or the early ascertainment of 
takers. Sometimes tblis policy is served to referring words 
of survivorship to the I testator's death rather than to a later 
point of time; sometimes, wI1ere there are no words of sur-
vivorship (and there are none applicable to issue in the in-
stant case), by closing the class at an earlier period of time 
rather than at a latei· possible time. It was at one time 
thought that Virginia had departed from this long estab-
lished rule or policy; 
1
see 178 Va. at page 405. But now by 
the two recent cases ~ye are assured that Driskill v. Carwile, 
145 Va. 116, and Callfs v. Rivley, 161 Va. 472, do not mark 
any modification of the Virginia rule but are merely instances 
in which the later point of vesting, or tlle later time of ascer-
tainment, was demanffecl by the particular lang-uag-e under 
. constrncti.011. l 
It is thought that any ot11er conclusion than that here 
reached and announced would tend to the undermining of the 
settled Virginia rule br policy. No jurisdiction has been a 
stronger adherent of fhis rule than has ours. T11e suspected 
departure or modific~tion has now in the two more recent 
. cases been authorit~ttvely denied and the ancient principles 
again announced with tl1e utmost firmness and vig·or. Sta-
bility in clobtrinc and policy is assuredly desirable. 
pagn 52 } It is consifler~d by the Court that thi~ decision 
hews to the hue and respects the ancient land-
Zayde B. Rennolcls, et aL., v. Elsie L. Branch, et al. 67 
marks; that any other would encouhtge the thought that the 
vigor of the rule aiid th~ strength of the policy have been, 
or are about to be, relaxed and weakened. 
A de~ree may be pfosented carrying out these cohciusions; 
,vhieh decree will make this opinion a part of the record. 
BROCKENBROUGH LAMB 
Richmond, yirg1nia; 
May 11; 1943. 
FOOTNOTE: 
. Under a certain conting·ency, whicl1, though not fanciful; 
is perhaps too remot~ to be worthy of mention in a formal 
opinion, there ~s in . this \\Till a strange lacuna which would 
bring about an intestacy as to the remaiilder despite the fact 
that many issue o.f the testator might be then alive. 
. The qnly . pra.ctical 1~~a.son for mentioning this bliildspot 
is that it affords a sufficient answer to the coiite:iition ear-
nestly and iibly inade by coum;el for ~he living issue of John 
Kerr Branch that the testator himself has bv the words "but 
shol]ld he'', that i~, Blythe w. Branch., '' leave i10 Ghild nor 
the issue of any chilc"l, him surviving'' defined what he mean::; 
by the clause '' ~ild tl1e i.ssue of su~h as ~ay_ have died leav.:. 
fog issue, s.uch. iss:ue to take per .stirpes. '' The argumen.t is 
that since in the former phras~ f;t1rvivqrship is .atta.ched to 
. . issue ~s w.ell as to c4ildrei;i, the meaning is made 
page 53 ~ clear that it slJOuld also attach to issue in the lat-
ter. 
Aside from the obvious comment that the child in the first 
iJhrase is the ch1ld of BlytJie ·\,r. Branch,. the lifetet}ant, and 
that the child in the second is the child of the testator:.-that 
is, an _entirely different class, 9:f a d.ifferent. generatiori-aii4 
th~ further comment that the in~ertjon in the op.e place anq. 
the omission.in the other of words of. survivorship as.applied 
to issit_e i·ather. squints to a c~iltrary interprefation,-:-it 
should be ppintec). out that the te~tator bas ;not hei·e afforded 
tis a definition. of his i11eanii1g·; all h~ lia~ done is to leave a 
strange and wholly unexijected gap iii his testamentary dis- · 
~ajti~. . . ' . 
. · The coiltiilgeilcy ref erred to_ is the remote but certainly not 
i.mpossible contingency that Blythe. Yv. Branch might have 
tl.ied leaviµg no issue save a ,qreat great grandch,ild "him 
survivi~g. ~' . . 
It. will be noted that Blythe "\V. Branch is given testa-
ineht~cy p9wer. of. appointment in the event, and only in the 
event he should die leaving a child, n grandchild or a great 
68 Supreme ~ourt of .Appeals of Virginia 
11randclvild "living at his death". He is not giveu this power 
if l1is only issue living· at his death is of a more remote de-
gree, for instance, a great great gra11dcl1ild. 
Furthermore,, issueJof Blythe "\V. Branch do- not take this 
remainder under the 
1
estator 's will unless he has the power 
of appointment and fa.Us to exercise it. '' Should he not, 
in such case, by his last will and testament appoint, then 
• * *" to his childrent-him surviving and the issue, &c. "In 
s,zwh case'' means having- power; and having power 
page 54 ~ depends upbn the theu survival of a child, a grand-
child or a great ,grandchild. The survival of more 
remote issue will neither confer the testamentary power nor 
bring about the exp1iess condition, "in suclt case", under 
which the children an<l issue of Blythe ,v. Branch will come 
into the remainder. I · · 
So if Blythe vV. Branch is survived hy a great g-reat grand-
child, and no issue of I nearer degree, the remainder does not 
g·o to Blythe "\V. Branch's issue under the provisions of the 
wm. . . . . I . . 
Nor would 1t m tlns event pass under the will to the testa-
tor's '' own child or cl1ildren then living, and the issue, &c. '' 
Because this devoluti6n, as counsel points out, is contingent 
upon Blythe W. Branch leaving· no is.me surviving him; the 
gift over, Blythe W. ~ranch having· left issue-a great great 
grandchild--:, is not effective. 
So in the event supposed the testator, even though he may 
have a living child atj the death of Blythe vV. Branch, is of 
necessity intestate as 'to this remainder. 
The ultimate truth is that the power of human expression, 
even in the hands of ~ skilled draftsman, is an imperfect in-
strument; and the co11struction of wills is far from an exact 
science. Meticulous &nd minute analvsis is most frequentlv 
a futile and a sterile process. The{~e remains in the sub-
stance dealt with so much marg·in of error, inherent and in• 
eradicable, that noth~ng· of value is gained by carrying the 
factor out to many decimal places. It is for this reason that 
these comrhents are made in a footnote. It is 
pag·e 55 ~ thoug·ht that they have no place in the formal 
opinion, which is based upon considerations less 
refined and tenuous,-+-and better suited, it is thought, to the 
objrct sought to be a~complished. 
I B. L. 
DECH.EE OF MAY 22, 1943. 
This cause, which Has been regularly matured at rules, set 
for hearing and docrted, came on this day to be finally 
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.heard upon the bill of complaint and exhibits therewith taken 
for confessed as to Margaret Branch Glasgow, who has ac-
cepted service of process, she still failing to appear, plead, 
.answer or demur; upon the joint and several answers of 
Elsie L. Branch, Melville C. Branch and Milton J, Beirne, 
Executors of the will of John Akin Branch, and of Elsie L. 
Branch in her own right; upon the joint answer of Zayde 
Branch Rennolds and Louise Branch, all the said answers 
having been heretofore filed by leave of Court; upon the stip-
ulation of facts dated l\'Iay 10, 1943, this day filed by leave of 
Court and made a part of the record; and was argued by 
,counsel. 
·Upon consideration whereof, it appearing to the Court 
from the bill of complaint and other pleadings in this cause, 
that the question now before the Court involves the inter-
pt·r.tation and construction of the last will and testament of 
.,John P. Branch, deceased, which was admitted to probate in 
this Court on March 4, 1915, and specifically the 
page 56 ~ devolution of the trust fund in which Blythe W. 
Branch, one of the testator's children, enjoyed a 
life estate., such devolution being governed by a portion of 
the 5th clause of the said will reading as follows: 
'' • * * but should he leave no child, nor the issue of any 
cchild, him surviving·, then the said principal sum shall pass 
and descend to my own child or children tlrnn living, and the 
Jssne of such as may have died leaving issue, such issue to 
take per stirpes.'' 
And it appearing from the record in the case that John 
Kerr Branch, a son of John P. Branch, died in the year 1930 
survived by all of his children, to-wit: ,John Akin Branch, 
Zayde Branch R.ennolds and LouiRe Branch; and that the 
said tT ohn Akin Brancl1 died in the year 1935; that Blythe 
'\V. Branch, a son of John P. Branch, died in the year 1942; 
and that Blythe vV. Branch was married but once, of which 
marriage no issue was born,-the Court is of the opinion, for 
reasons set forth in writing dated May 11, 1943, and now 
made a part of the record, that the members of the class de-
scribed in the languag·e of the will above quoted as '' the issue 
of such as may have died leaving issue'' are to be determined 
as of the death of the testator's child who was the ancestor 
of such issue, and hence that the issue of ,T ohn Kerr Branch 
who take as members of such class are to be determined as 
of his, John Kerr Branch's death, and it is so adjudged., or-
dered and decreed; 
I 
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page 57 ~ And acc01jdingly · it is further adjudged, ordered 
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and decreed that :Melville C. Brauch and Robert 
G.- Cabell, III, Trustee$ under the will of John P. Branch, de~ 
ceased,, complainants, ao _divide and distribute the property 
constituting the trust ~eld for Blythe ,v. Branch for his life, 
to the following nam~d persons in the proportions set op-= 
~osite their names: j 
Margaret Branch Gl~sgow 
Zavde Branch R.ennolds 




Elsie L. Branch, Melvijlh~· C. Branch and ~fiiton .T; 
Beirne, Executors1 of John Akin Branch, de-
ceased; i one-sixth 
..A.nd counsel for zkvde Branch Rennolcls anci Louise 
Branch having duly objected to the entry of this decree upon 
the following ground~ as stated by thetn: "tlmt under c1: 
ptoper iiiterpreta tion and cqnstruction of the will of the saicl 
.J ohil P .. Branch, and acGotding to the true intent and mean-
ing_ of th~ testator, as! shown and express.eel in said will, th~ 
said Zayde B1~anch Re~nolds .a~d Louise Branch, at and upo~ 
the death of the said Blythe W. Branch, became then entitled 
to, and w~re the qnly; issue of the s~id J o~n. Kerr ~ranch, 
deceased, mtenqed by the testatqr to part~cipate with th~ 
said Margaret ~railcp_ Gla~gow ~il, the enjoyinent of said 
trust_ est~te"; and coun~el for said Zayde Branch Rennolds 
and Louise Bmnch having further indicated their intentioi:I 
to appl:y- f_?r an appeal and suversedea.CJ frol'!-1 this_ 
pnge 58 ~ decree., it 1s further ordered that the operation of 
this dec~ee, save_ as to th~ one-half to be distrib-
t1ted tQ Marg·aret Br~nch GJasgow, be suspended for a p~-
riod of four months fi~om this day, counsel for all parties iri 
iiJterest ):iaviJJ.g agr~ed to waive the execution of a suspe1i-= 
siort bond as is reqt~irfd b_y law in. such c~s_e. 
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.I, Albert T. August, Clerk of the Chancery Court of tl1€~ 
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